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ABSTRACT 
Repeated interviews are common during an investigation, and perceived consistency 
between multiple statements is associated with an interviewee’s credibility. Furthermore, 
research has shown that the act of lying can affect a person’s memory for what truthfully 
occurred. The current study assessed the influence of lying on memory during initial and 
repeated interviews, as well as how an interviewer’s approach might affect between-statement 
consistency for true and false statements. In Experiment 1, participants performed actions, and 
then later lied or told the truth by describing these actions or by denying they had performed 
them. After each statement, participants provided judgments of learning for their lies and truths. 
One week later, participants were tested on their source memory. In Experiment 2, I adapted this 
procedure to manipulate whether participants were able to choose the items that they would lie 
and tell the truth about, as well as whether participants provided memory prediction ratings. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, people believed they would remember – and did actually remember – 
truthfully rehearsed actions better, especially when they described actions. However, in 
Experiment 2, there were no differences for people who were able to exert volition over their lies 
and truths with respect to source memory accuracy or statement consistency. In Experiment 3, 
participants performed a scavenger hunt at four different locations on campus and then were 
either dismissed or interviewed (with a reverse order instruction or a control interview) about 
their activities. Participants chose two of the locations to tell the truth about and then created a lie 
about activities in two other buildings that had not been visited. One week later, all participants 
provided a second free recall statement about their activities during the scavenger hunt, and then 
a final truthful description of both areas that were visited during the scavenger hunt. Truthfully 
rehearsed experiences were associated with more accurate recall of information learned during 
 x 
the scavenger hunt as well as more consistent statements. The control interview led to initially 
more detailed statements, but more inconsistencies in the form of omissions.
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
The perception of inconsistency as an indicator of deception can have severe 
consequences for those implicated within the criminal justice system. During the course of an 
investigation, it is common for a suspect to be interviewed on multiple occasions – in one 
sample, investigators reported interviewing suspects an average of three separate times (Kassin, 
Leo, Meissner, Richman, Colwell, Leach, & La Fon, 2007). Importantly, a suspect who is 
repeatedly interviewed must be as consistent as possible to be perceived as credible (Fisher, Vrij, 
& Leins, 2013). For instance, inconsistency across statements led prosecutors to pursue 
allegations of repeated deception by Paul Manafort in the Mueller investigation (Hsu & Weiner, 
2019). In addition to contradictions that arose between Manafort’s statements and the evidence 
obtained by the special counsel, Manafort was inconsistent across several interviews regarding 
the charge of conspiring with a Russian aide (Helderman, Weiner, & Hsu, 2018). After pleading 
guilty to the charge, Manafort retracted his plea in a subsequent interview, and then on a later 
occasion ultimately admitted that his initial plea was truthful. These discrepancies between both 
the acquired evidence and between Manafort’s own statements led Judge Amy Jackson to rule 
that this “deception” violated Manafort’s plea agreement. As a result, prosecutors were not 
compelled to recommend leniency and Manafort was sentenced more harshly, compared to if he 
had honored his plea agreement and fully cooperated with the investigation (LaFranier, 2019).  
In the current dissertation, I explore the interaction between memory and inconsistency, 
particularly in the context of deception in repeated interviews. Across multiple interviews, guilty 
suspects must use these occasions to convince an interviewer that they are innocent. In contrast, 
innocent suspects have the chance to prove their innocence repeatedly. Alterations to one’s 
statement, regardless of the intention behind them, are often used to question the validity of a 
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witness (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Lusczc, 1999), as well as to identify a person who may 
be providing a false statement (e.g., Granhag & Strömwall, 2001). Repeated interviews therein 
pose a quandary for both innocent and guilty suspects. Innocent suspects are challenged with 
maintaining between-statement consistency, which can be difficult for truth-tellers who are 
strategically forthcoming (Hartwig & Granhag, 2008). Inconsistencies can appear, for instance, 
when a person offers new information that had not been provided in a previous statement 
(termed reminiscence), or when a person fails to recall information that had been provided in a 
previous statement (termed oblivescence; Erdelyi, 2010). Reminiscence and oblivescence thus 
reflect natural underlying cognitive processes that can arise as a result of repeated retrieval 
(Ballard, 1913). Should a truth-teller remember some information after an initial interview, 
providing those reminiscent details might lead an investigator to question their credibility.  
Guilty suspects, on the other hand, will need to remember a previously provided false 
statement in order to maintain consistency across interviews. There are two types of false 
statements that a guilty suspect can provide: either a false description or a false denial of an 
event. In the case of the former, a suspect may describe an event or an experience differently 
than how it actually occurred or describe an event that never occurred. Lying, in this instance, 
requires the suspect to confabulate details to create a plausible account. Alternatively, the suspect 
may lie by falsely denying that an event occurred, despite the fact that the event did take place. 
Psychological research has shown that the type of false statement that is provided can carry 
implications for one’s ability to remember that lie, and that the act of lying can change a person’s 
memory for the truth (see Dianiska, Cash, Lane, & Meissner, 2019). As such, the manner in 
which a guilty suspect provides a false statement could influence not only their ability to appear 
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credible (i.e., consistent) on subsequent interviews, but also their memory for what truthfully 
occurred.  
Regardless of guilt, the interaction between lying and memory has implications for a 
suspect’s experience with the criminal justice system. For instance, whether guilty suspects are 
able to maintain their false narratives over time could have significant downstream consequences 
that lead to their conviction. On a subsequent interview, the ability to remember (and repeat; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) what was said in an initial interview is extremely important given 
the common perception that inconsistency is associated with deception (Vredeveldt, van Koppen, 
& Granhag, 2014). Furthermore, the act of telling a lie itself might change a suspect’s memory 
for their own experience. That is, suspects could come to believe their own lies as the truth, and 
falsely remember (or in an extreme case, falsely confess to; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004) 
something that did not occur. 
Reliance upon consistency as an indicator of truth or deception can also negatively affect 
innocent suspects who seek to be cooperative with an interviewer. Truth-tellers’ statements will 
be grounded in their memory for an event, and because memory is reconstructive, errors might 
be likely to appear (Bartlett, 1932). Should an innocent person provide an initially mistaken 
statement due to faulty memory and come to realize their error, any attempt to correct their 
statement by providing contradictory information might lead to suspicion as a result of that 
inconsistency (Crozier, Strange, & Luke, 2017). Therefore, unwarranted mistrust of an 
inconsistent (but innocent) alibi provider could potentially redirect the course of an investigation 
away from pursuing a different suspect. Herein, it is important that investigators consider the 
type of inconsistency and the role of memory inherent to the recall attempt. Despite advantages 
associated with the use of certain memory enhancing or strategic questioning strategies 
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(discussed below), the impact of such tactics have not yet been fully assessed with respect to 
possible misattributions of deception and guilt due to inconsistencies across statements.  
In this dissertation I focus on the influence of lying on memory during initial and 
subsequent (i.e., repeated) interviews. Specifically, I explored the role of volitional deception 
and the manner in which a suspect is interviewed on interviewees’ accuracy and consistency 
across multiple statements. I conducted three experiments that extended the current literature 
from the laboratory into more ecologically valid contexts. Below, I first review the basic 
psychological processes thought to be involved in the act of deception, as well as proposed 
theoretical accounts of when and how the act of deception affects memory. Next, I describe the 
primary paradigms used to examine the interaction between deception and memory, and discuss 
the potential role of volition as a moderator of that interaction. I then review research on 
consistency across repeated interviews for both truth-tellers and liars and discuss how 
conventional investigative interviewing techniques might increase or decrease inconsistencies. 
Cognitive Processes Involved in Deception 
Recent theoretical and empirical work has explored the basic processes involved in 
generating a lie (Sporer, 2016; Vrij 2015; Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003; 
Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014). Further, neural correlates and contributing brain 
regions implicated in deception have been identified (Abe, 2009; Christ, Van Essen, Watson, 
Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009; Lisofsky, Kazzer, Heekeren, Prehn, 2014). Cognitive theories of 
deception suggest that generating a lie requires more time to produce than telling the truth – a 
hypothesis that has been supported by numerous reaction-time deception paradigms (see 
Suchotzki et al., 2017). 
Walczyk et al. (2003) proposed that three events precede a deceptive response to a 
question. First, semantic and episodic information that is related to the truth is activated. Next, a 
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respondent must decide to lie or tell the truth in order to further one’s own self-interest. Finally, a 
plausible lie is constructed based on the related semantic and episodic information that has been 
retrieved from memory. This three-step process ultimately increases the response time required 
to generate a deceptive statement, when compared with the time required to generate a truthful 
statement (Activation-Decision-Construction Model; ADCM). Across three experiments, 
Walczyk and colleagues demonstrated that participants took longer to respond to questions that 
probed personal, factual information (e.g., “Do you believe in God?” or “What is your favorite 
alcoholic beverage?”) when they were providing deceptive responses. This was especially 
pronounced when the questions probed potentially embarrassing information (about which 
people would be more likely to lie).  
A more recent update to the ADCM model of deception incorporated additional 
contextual factors, such as motivational and emotional components, in order to model high-
stakes deception (Activation-Decision-Construction-Action theory or ADCAT; Walczyk et al., 
2014). The first step in this theory involves some aspect of the social context activating a truthful 
response, such as when a detective explicitly asks a question during an investigative interview. 
The decision component involves a calculated choice to provide a deceptive response over a 
truthful response. When making this choice, a respondent must consider the costs and benefits 
associated with lying (versus telling the truth) and decide if being deceptive will produce a more 
favorable outcome. Recent empirical tests of propositions made by ADCAT suggest that the 
decision to lie may be more related to a respondent’s motivation and the expected value of telling 
the truth (Masip, Blandón-Gitlin, de la Riva, & Herrero, 2016), rather than the expected value of 
being deceptive (cf. Walczyk, Tcholakian, Newman, & Duck, 2016; Cassidy, Wyman, Talwar, & 
Akehurst, 2019).  
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After deciding to lie, the respondent then constructs the deceptive response. The way in 
which a respondent constructs the lie (e.g., by denying or by describing) will vary in the amount 
of cognitive load imposed by the construction process. During this stage, a liar will manipulate 
the information in order to strategically present a plausible lie to maximize its believability. 
Finally, the action component involves the respondent delivering the lie to the receiver. To do so 
effectively, the respondent will inhibit the automatically-activated truthful response (if it is 
required) and reduce extraneous load by engaging in self-regulatory behaviors (e.g., by breaking 
eye contact; Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull, 2008).  
Sporer (2016) has criticized the tendency in the field to prioritize manipulating cognitive 
load at the expense of studying the underlying cognitive processes involved in such 
manipulations. For instance, manipulating cognitive load by requiring an interviewee to recall an 
event in reverse-chronological order is not the same as investigating the processes that are 
induced when an event is recalled in reverse-chronological order. Consequently, Sporer 
introduced a working memory model of deception to explain differences in lie and truth 
generation based on these processes. From a working memory perspective (Baddeley, 2012), 
imposing cognitive load should make it more difficult for liars to engage in self-regulatory 
behaviors and control gestures that would indicate nervousness. Further, in line with other 
models of deception, liars will indeed take longer to respond than truth-tellers. According to 
Sporer, however, they will do so because truth-tellers are better able to capitalize on existing 
memory traces and are therefore faster to respond. Liars, in contrast, must either invent entirely 
new stories or rely on past experiences or existing scripts, which will be especially taxing when 
these experiences or scripts are absent from long-term memory.  
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Neurological Processes Involved in Deception 
With respect to neurological findings, the prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex 
are commonly implicated in the production of a deceptive response (Abe, 2011; Christ et al., 
2009). For instance, Abe and colleagues (2009) assessed performance on a yes/no memory task, 
during which participants lied or told the truth about having studied (or not studied) items 
presented by four unique actors. Specifically, participants were instructed to lie when prompted 
with one of the four actors, and to tell the truth when prompted with the other three actors. 
Patients with Parkinson’s disease with frontal executive dysfunction demonstrated an impaired 
ability to tell a lie relative to healthy controls (Abe et al., 2009). That is, Parkinsonian patients 
provided fewer correct deceptive responses when prompted with the actor to whom they should 
have lied.  
Further, there is considerable overlap between areas that are recruited for deception and 
areas that are recruited for executive control (Christ et al., 2009). Christ and colleagues (2009) 
used an activation likelihood estimate meta-analytic technique to produce maps of brain regions 
activated when a person is being deceptive. Regions consistently activated during deception 
included the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and right anterior 
cingulate cortex. Additionally, meta-analytic maps of regions associated with three executive 
functions (working memory, inhibitory control, and task switching) were compared to the 
deception-related map to determine the extent of overlap between deception areas and executive 
control areas. The majority of the deception-related areas overlapped with areas associated with 
the executive functions that were examined. However, three areas – the right middle frontal 
gyrus, the right inferior parietal lobule, and the left middle frontal gyrus – shared unique 
activation on the deception map and the working memory map, but were not activated during 
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inhibitory control or task switching. These findings suggest that although inhibitory control and 
task switching may play a role in deception, deception may primarily rely on working memory.  
Deception paradigms that involve a social component (e.g., providing lies to a real 
interaction partner) activate more regions than those involved in non-interactive deception 
(Lisofsky et al., 2014). Specifically, Lisofsky et al. (2014) examined whether deception that 
involves socio-cognitive processes, such as inferring an interaction partner’s mental state, 
engages different neural correlates than deception that does not involve social interaction. Brain 
regions associated with deception generally, such as the anterior cingulate cortex, showed 
heightened activation during socially interactive deception paradigms. Further, brain regions 
associated with social cognition – including the temporo-parietal junction, which overlaps with 
the inferior parietal lobule (Igelström & Graziano, 2017) – were found to be more active during 
socially interactive deception paradigms rather than non-interactive paradigms. Thus, deception 
that involves more ecologically valid characteristics, such as the presence of an interaction 
partner, recruits brain regions in addition to those required for the deceptive narrative itself. 
Providing a deceptive account may also be similar to episodic simulation or episodic 
future thought, which involves the imagination and generation of a mentally pre-experienced 
future event that draws on elements of past experiences (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2008). Retrieval from episodic memory serves as the basis upon which episodic future thoughts 
are constructed, as suggested by neuroimaging studies that have shown distinct construction and 
elaboration phases when describing past and future events (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2007). During episodic future thought, people first engage in a construction phase in which one 
creates a future event. Subsequently, the future event is supplemented with additional details by 
either retrieving or imagining details during an elaboration phase.  
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Mental simulation of a future event could also be relevant to how people mentally create 
a false description of an event. One self-reported strategy that liars use is to provide a narrative 
that remains close to the truth (Strömwall & Willén, 2011). Episodic memory is thus not only 
important for remembering and recounting a truthful experience, but also for the mental 
simulation that is necessary to fabricate false events. The perceptual and contextual details 
generated during elaboration represent a potential negative corollary of such mental simulation. 
Specifically, the presence of these details could lead to source monitoring problems when a 
person attempts to discriminate a truthful experience from an invented experience (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsey, 1993).  
When Does Lying Affect Memory? 
Researchers have begun to examine the consequences of generating a deceptive statement 
on a liar’s memory for what was said while lying as well as for what truthfully occurred. The act 
of deception could have an effect on memory due to the success (or failure) of a person’s ability 
to monitor the source or origin of information – source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993). As 
noted above, a person may provide a false statement in the form of a description or in the form of 
a denial. In the case of a descriptive lie, the lie involves a person describing an event that either 
never occurred or occurred differently in some respects. In contrast, false denials refer to lies that 
involve saying that an event did not occur.  
False descriptions and false denials differ in the extent to which effortful, constructive 
mental processing is required. As a result, these two types of lies tend to differentially affect both 
accurate memory and false memory (Vieira & Lane, 2013). Lies that are told via false 
description are more likely to be correctly remembered due to the constructive processes 
involved in generating the descriptions. Providing a brief false denial, on the other hand, requires 
less effort to produce and is therefore more easily forgotten. However, memory for false denials 
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can improve when the denials are repeated (Vieira & Lane, 2013; Dianiska, Lane, Vieira, & 
Cash, in preparation). Due to these constructive processes, false descriptions can paradoxically 
be more likely to be misremembered as the truth, should the act of generating a description as a 
lie (rather than as a truth) be forgotten (Polage, 2004; Vieira & Lane, 2013). In this case, the 
content of the lie is retained, but the reason for its generation (e.g., to tell a lie) is not.  
A Source-Monitoring Perspective 
The dominant theoretical explanation for the effects of false description on memory is 
rooted in the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993). Source monitoring refers to a 
person’s ability to differentiate between competing memory traces or sources of information. 
When making source decisions, people can capitalize on average differences in features that are 
associated with different sources. For instance, perceived or externally-derived events are more 
likely to be associated with perceptual and contextual (i.e., spatial and temporal) details, whereas 
imagined or internally-derived events often include more cognitive operations (i.e., evidence of 
mental processes invoked; Johnson et al., 1993).  
Source monitoring errors are more likely to occur when sources are similar, when 
encoding is impaired, or when the cues that are available at retrieval are weak (see Lindsay, 
2008). By providing a false description, liars generate a new memory trace (for the deceptive 
statement) that competes with the old trace (for what truthfully occurred). In order to appear 
convincing, a liar may provide a rich, detailed description of an event that includes fabricated 
perceptual and contextual details. Thus, generating a particularly elaborated false description 
involves effortful constructive processing that should increase the availability of cognitive 
operations. However, the fabricated details contained in that description would also have been 
present if the event had been truly experienced, increasing the likelihood that the presence of 
these details in memory could lead to confusion as to whether those perceptual details were 
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actually perceived in reality. As a result, the same processes that increase the likelihood of a liar 
remembering that she lied can also increase the probability of source monitoring failures and 
high-confident reporting of false information. 
Source monitoring errors that arise when a liar generates a false description (in order to 
mislead another) are similar to errors that arise when a forced fabricator generates a description 
(as a guess in response to questions about unknown information; Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998). 
People might have difficulty in distinguishing forced fabrications from truthfully witnessed 
events due to the high degree of similarity between two sources, as would be suggested by 
source monitoring framework (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013; Johnson et al., 1993). An alternate 
mechanism could be a feeling of familiarity that occurs from self-generating the description 
(Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). However, false descriptions can differ 
from forced fabrications due to the intentionality associated with their production (DePaulo et 
al., 2003). Specifically, false descriptions are generated with an explicit attempt to mislead and 
be deceptive. Forced fabrications, on the other hand, are generated as a “best guess” in response 
to interrogative pressure.  
A (Directed) Forgetting Perspective 
Several studies have shown that false denials can lead to memory impairments for denied 
items (Vieira & Lane, 2013) as well as for the act of denial itself (Otgaar, Howe, Memon, & 
Wang, 2014; Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Wang, 2016; Romeo, Otgaar, Smeets, Landstrom, 
Boerboom, 2018). A recent theoretical framework proposed by Otgaar and Baker (2018) 
suggests that the mechanism responsible for this impairment could be a lack of rehearsal. 
Specifically, when people deny that an event truthfully occurred, they forgo rehearsing 
information and details that were present during the original event. Denials also do not require 
the liar to fabricate new details, and thus require less effort (i.e., fewer cognitive operations) to 
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produce than a description. As an alternative explanation, participants may spontaneously engage 
in a retrieval inhibition strategy akin to what occurs in the directed forgetting phenomenon. In 
directed forgetting experiments, participants are instructed to “remember” or “forget” randomly 
interspersed items in a list of words (item-method) or to “forget” an entire list (list-method) prior 
to a subsequent memory test. The attentional inhibition hypothesis suggests that the instruction to 
“forget” an item engages a suppression mechanism of “forget” words at encoding, resulting in 
those items being removed from working memory and preventing their future access at retrieval 
(a cost). This suppression thus frees resources to process and encode the to-be-remembered items 
that receive a “remember” instruction (a benefit, Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996; Fawcett & 
Taylor, 2008). Although people who provide false denials are not explicitly instructed to 
“forget,” they may nevertheless use an inhibition strategy unprompted (in order to not think 
about items that were witnessed) to facilitate the generation and delivery of their deceptive 
statements. 
Contemporary Paradigms for Studying the Impact of Lying on Memory 
Table 1  
Summary of Paradigms Used to Study Deception and Memory 
Research Lab Paradigm Derivation Stimulus Outcome Measure 
Polage Imagination Inflation Life events Belief in occurrence of event 
Lane List-Learning Studied objects; 
Performed actions 
Source memory accuracy 
Accurate and false recognition 
Otgaar Forced Fabrication Video witnessed 
event 
Source memory for “person” and 
“video” details 
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To date, researchers examining the impact of lying on memory have employed a variety 
of approaches and paradigms, yielding a slightly incongruous picture. Table 1 presents a 
summary and overview of the typical paradigms used to assess the interface of lying and 
memory. Though some researchers have employed paradigms that prioritize ecological validity 
over the creation and elaboration of rich false narratives (e.g., unexperienced childhood events, 
Polage 2004; 2012), much of the extant research has relied upon stimulus materials that can be 
objectively verified as true or false (e.g., studied pictures of objects, Vieira & Lane, 2013; mock 
crime video, Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Wang, 2016). Further, the most commonly used 
paradigms experimentally control when and about what participants lie versus tell the truth (cf. 
Hudson, Vrij, Akehurst, & Hope, 2019; Romeo, Otgaar, Smeets, Landstrom, & Boerboom, 
2018).  
 
Figure 1. Depiction of the autobiographical events paradigm used by Polage (2004) and Polage 
(2012) 
Polage (2004; 2012) examined source monitoring performance in the context of true and 
false autobiographical events by employing an adaption of the imagination inflation paradigm 
(Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). Participants completed a Life Events Inventory, a 
checklist of childhood events (e.g., “Were you caught sneaking out of the house?”) on which 
they rated the likelihood that the events occurred before they were 10 years old (see Figure 1). 
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Across two subsequent interviews, participants created believable narratives affirming that a set 
of childhood events (which included experienced events as well as a target lied-about event) had 
happened to them and were instructed to do so by lying if necessary. After constructing these 
detailed narratives, some participants altered their ratings of whether they believed the event 
occurred to them. However, the direction of the change in belief ratings depended on the source 
monitoring capability afforded by the paradigm.  
Polage (2004) found a “deflation” effect on memory, whereby participants rated the lied-
about events as less believable than truthfully-described target events, when the time between lie 
generation and test was relatively short. Therefore, the act of fabricating a rich narrative account 
of an unexperienced event likely produced memories of the cognitive operations involved in 
generating those narratives. Participants were then able to use these as cues to determine that the 
memory had not been experienced. In contrast, Polage (2012) later observed an “inflation” effect 
when source monitoring ability was poor or disrupted. Here, the lying event was temporally 
separated from the memory test. Presumably, people were more likely to believe that their self-
generated false narratives were truthfully experienced because information about cognitive 
operations was less available. Unfortunately, this paradigm prevents an assessment of accuracy 
given that it is impossible to establish ground truth for participants’ false narratives. Further, only 
one type of lie (false descriptions) were assessed with respect to source memory. 
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Figure 2. Depiction of the general object paradigm used by Dianiska, Lane, et al. (in prep) and 
Vieira and Lane (2013). 
 Lane and colleagues (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in preparation; Vieira & Lane, 2013) have 
extended this previous work by examining a broader set of variables that reflect myriad ways in 
which lies are told (e.g., different types of lies, how many times a lie is repeated, whether the lie 
content is self-relevant). In these studies, participants first study a series of object images (Vieira 
& Lane) or perform a set of simple interactions with objects (Dianiska, Lane et al.; see Figure 2). 
Subsequently, participants are prompted by the computer with the name of the object (or action) 
and asked to truthfully or deceptively describe the item (or action) that they had seen 
(performed), or to deny that they had done so. Participants then either lie or tell the truth 
regarding these items to a video camera. Half of the lies and truths are rehearsed once, and half 
are rehearsed three times. Another set of items seen at encoding, but not discussed on camera, 
serve as control items on the final test. After a delay (48 hours in Vieira & Lane, 2013; 1 week in 
Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep), participants are asked to indicate for each item (action) whether 
they had seen it (performed the action), whether they had lied or told the truth about it, and if so, 
whether they had done so by describing it or denying it. Another study further examined source 
memory performance by assessing the phenomenological basis on which source decisions were 
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made (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep). For each action that participants indicated they had 
performed, they were asked whether that decision was based on recollection or familiarity (or if 
it was simply a guess). In this context, a “recollect” response was provided if one could 
remember a contextual detail about seeing an object or having performed the action. If this 
information was absent but the object felt familiar, a “familiar” response would be provided (see 
Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  
Across both studies (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep; Vieira & Lane, 2013), participants 
were less likely to remember their denials compared to their descriptions. Furthermore, repetition 
of an item (regardless of veracity) increased source accuracy. With respect to memory errors, or 
the false recognition of unstudied items as having been seen or performed in a prior session, 
there were two primary findings. First, repeated truthful denials increased the likelihood of false 
memory. Repeatedly denying that one had seen an item that, in reality, had not actually been 
seen (e.g., saying “I did not see the book,” when they actually had not studied a book), led 
participants to falsely remember having seen that item on a delayed memory test, relative to 
unrehearsed control items. This type of error tended to be based on feelings of familiarity and 
increased guessing, rather than recollection (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep). Second, false 
memory was more likely following false descriptions, particularly at the longer delay. 
Furthermore, these errors were more likely to be based on the false recollection of details rather 
than familiarity. Interestingly, repetition did not increase false description errors, likely due to 
participants’ remembering that they had generated the description and using this information to 
correctly attribute it to having been fabricated.  
Limitations with this paradigm include the constrained nature of the experimental task 
and the potential lack of detail present in the descriptions. In the case of the former, the paradigm 
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used by Lane and colleagues allows for manipulation of important ecological variables, but 
participants are still instructed to lie by an experimenter. With regard to the latter, when people 
provide a false description about an image or a performed action, the amount of elaboration and 
level of detail for these types of descriptions might be more concise than the descriptions that, 
for instance, a guilty suspect would provide as a false alibi. 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of the witnessed event paradigm used by Romeo et al. (2018), Otgaar et al. 
(2014) and Otgaar et al. (2016). 
Finally, Otgaar and colleagues (Otgaar, Howe, Memon, & Wang, 2014; Otgaar, Howe, 
Smeets, & Wang, 2016) have examined the influence of both false descriptions and false denials 
on later memory using an adaptation of the forced fabrication paradigm (Ackil & Zaragoza, 
1998). In these studies, participants view a series of pictures (Otgaar et al. 2016) or a brief 
witnessed event (Otgaar et al., 2014; 2016) and are asked to complete a baseline memory test 
(see Figure 3). On this memory test, participants rate details present in the video in terms of their 
belief in occurrence and the quality of their memory for the detail. During a subsequent interview 
phase, participants are then randomly assigned to respond to only questions that they are sure 
about (cued recall group), to respond to all questions and to guess if they are not sure (forced 
confabulation group), or to deny in response to each question (false denial group). The questions 
in the interview phase corresponded to either details that were present in the video (true-event 
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questions) or not present in the video (false-event questions). Across multiple experiments, 
Otgaar and colleagues have found that when participants are forced to falsely deny details during 
an initial interview, they demonstrate impaired memory for discussing a denied item with an 
interviewer, but not in memory for seeing the item itself (i.e., denial-induced forgetting; cf. 
Romeo, Otgaar, Smeets, Landström, & Boerboom, 2018).  
Recent work by Otgaar and colleagues (Romeo et al., 2018) has also found a denial-
induced forgetting effect for both participants’ memory for the interview and their memory for 
the event details. Specifically, Romeo et al. (2018) presented participants with a traumatic virtual 
reality event (an airplane crash site) and then assessed their baseline memory for the event. 
Participants were then instructed to choose a strategy (i.e., tell the truth, falsely deny, or 
fabricate) for a subsequent structured interview comprised of 12 yes/no questions. Depending on 
the strategy, participants either (i) responded honestly, (ii) denied having seen each item, or (iii) 
affirmed and added an additional detail. On a final source memory test, participants in the false 
denial condition demonstrated a “denial-induced forgetting effect” (i.e., poorer memory for 
having discussed a detail during a prior memory task) relative to truth-tellers. Further, they also 
found that denial impaired memory for details present in the witnessed event. Given 
inconsistencies across studies conducted by Otgaar and colleagues, whether denials affect 
memory for the interview as well as memory for the event requires further assessment.  
Taken together, the extant research on descriptions and denials by liars and truth tellers 
has focused on determining the mechanisms that underlie the relationship between deception and 
memory. However, one (potential) hindrance to the applicability of these findings is that 
participants in such studies are often instructed to lie at the behest of an experimenter, whereas 
deception in the real world is characterized by some degree of volition or intentionality (DePaulo 
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et al., 2003). Further, interviewees almost never wholly lie or tell the truth in a forensic 
interview. Both researchers and practitioners aim to capitalize on this within-subject or within-
interviewee variability in providing lies and truths, for example by establishing a verbal 
“baseline,” deviations from which can be used to facilitate lie detection (Vrij, 2016). Finally, 
deception studies rarely assess statements provided across multiple interviews (cf. Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2001). Two aims of this dissertation are thus (i) to assess the extent to which 
allowing individuals to voluntarily engage in deception may influence the effects of lying on 
memory, and (ii) to assess the extent to which statement inconsistencies become apparent and are 
reliable indicators of deception when repeated interviews are conducted using evidence-based 
interviewing techniques.  
Volitional Deception and Memory 
Lying is defined by the intentionality to mislead another person (DePaulo et al., 2003), 
yet the current field of research on the relationship between lying and memory has largely failed 
to assess the notion of deception as a volitional act. Participants may be asked to lie about a 
number of items in a given experiment, but what separates providing a “lie” from providing an 
objectively false statement (e.g., as a result a false memory) is an intent to deceive a conversation 
partner. Further, meta-analytic assessments of neuroimaging studies have shown differential 
activation for deception that involves volitional rather than instructed lies (Lisofsky et al., 2014). 
Participants who were allowed to choose whether and when to deceive an interaction partner 
showed greater activation in the bilateral inferior parietal lobule relative to participants who 
engaged in paradigms that involved experimenter-instructed deception. The inferior parietal 
lobule has been implicated in higher-order functions such as memory retrieval (e.g., the 
maintenance of retrieved information; Villberg & Rugg, 2008) and social cognition (Igelström & 
Graziano, 2008), and there is preliminary evidence of its role in functions such as intentional 
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movement (e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Kühn, Haggard, & Brass, 2009) and a sense of agency 
(Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010). However, because studies included in this meta-analysis 
were conducted primarily to examine differences in neurological activation, whether differences 
in volitional versus instructed deception would influence memory performance remains 
unexamined. Though a reliance on experimenter-instructed lies has allowed for experimental 
control over the falsehoods that are generated, the underlying processes involved in deception 
might differ depending on whether deception is intentional or instructed. Thus, the extant 
experimental findings on how lying affects memory may only be applicable to situations in 
which motivation to lie is absent or low. 
Of note, Romeo et al. (2018) attempted to manipulate the intentionality associated with 
deception by allowing participants to self-select a strategy for an interview. Although 
participants were allowed to choose what strategy they would like to use during an interview 
(either tell the truth, falsely deny, or fabricate), only 14% chose to be deceptive. As a result, 
Romeo et al. excluded those 14% and only included truth-tellers and a subset of participants who 
initially chose to tell the truth but were later instructed to falsely deny. Further, Hudson et al. 
(2019) allowed participants to choose from one of two tasks: stealing a flash drive (and lying 
about it during a subsequent interview) or watching a short documentary (and telling the truth 
about it during a subsequent interview). In addition to self-selected liars and truth-tellers, a 
separate group of participants were instructed to complete the deceptive tasks to equate the size 
of the groups. There was a marginally significant difference between volitional liars and 
instructed liars in the amount of detail provided during a subsequent interview (d = 0.44, p = 
.05); nevertheless, analyses were collapsed across the volitional manipulation for the primary 
analyses. Thus, whether volition has an impact on memory cannot be determined from these 
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studies because too few participants chose to deny or fabricate, or because volitional liars were 
combined with instructed liars in final analyses. Manipulating volition for some items (rather 
than some participants) in the current dissertation allowed for an examination of the relationship 
between deception and memory when intentionality is involved.  
Could volition have an effect on a person’s memory? Prior research suggests that 
individuals who choose which items to study perform better than those who are assigned study 
items by an experimenter (Perlmuter, Monty, & Kimble, 1971). Perlmuter and colleagues (1971) 
examined whether choosing responses prior to learning a list of words would affect memory 
performance. Participants were asked to remember pairs of words. For each pair, they were 
presented with a stimulus word and shown five possible response options to be associated with 
the stimulus. Some participants selected a response to be paired with the stimulus word on a 
subsequent paired-associates learning task (choice group), while other participants were assigned 
the stimulus-response word selected by participants in the choice group (forced group). When 
participants were allowed to choose the response for the word pairs, they recalled more correct 
responses on a subsequent cued-recall task. This effect was originally thought to be the result of 
the choice group’s enhanced ability to form stimulus-response associations. Later research, 
however, suggests this “self-choice” effect might be due to the activation of multiple response 
candidates when choosing (Watanabe, 2001). 
In the education domain, the effects of volition on memory are also well-known with 
respect to selecting items that receive further study. Memory tends to be enhanced when 
individuals are able to exert control over their learning environment, including what information 
is encoded (e.g., Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006). Across three experiments, Kornell and Metcalfe 
(2006) assessed the relationship between metacognitively guided study and performance on a 
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subsequent memory task. Compared to conditions that did not honor a participant’s study 
choices, people who were allowed to choose selected easier items, which ultimately benefited 
them on a later memory test. As such, the potential role of choosing which aspects of an event 
receive further rehearsal (either deceptively or truthfully) could be an important moderator on the 
relationship between lying and memory. 
Kornell and Metcalfe (2006) suggest that the benefit to chosen versus unchosen items is 
associated with improved metacognition that accompanies the act of choosing. A similar 
mechanism could account for any such benefit to memory following volitional deception. 
Recently, Besken (2018) examined the relationship between deception and memory while also 
assessing the metamemory of liars and truth-tellers. Participants provided correct (truthful) or 
incorrect (deceptive) answers to a series of general knowledge questions, and subsequently rated 
their confidence that they would remember their response on a later memory test (a “judgment of 
learning”). Following a brief distraction phrase, participants freely recalled their responses to the 
general knowledge questions from the prior phase of the experiment. Besken (2018) found 
evidence of a “metacognitive illusion” of lying, such that people were more confident that they 
would accurately remember their truthful responses on a subsequent memory test, but in actuality 
they recalled more of their deceptive responses.  
As reviewed above, the type of lie that is told tends to differentially affect memory 
performance and so may also affect metamemory performance. What liars believe about their 
own ability to remember different types of lies could inform how guilty suspects approach 
investigative interviews. Liars will often invoke an avoidant strategy (i.e., providing little 
information in their statement) or an escape strategy (i.e., denying their involvement in response 
to an interviewer’s direct questioning; Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Therefore, whether a liar 
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believes they will be able to remember a denial might affect the likelihood that she will use an 
escape strategy. The optimal strategy will likely vary based on a suspect’s perception of the 
evidence against him (Granhag & Hartwig, 2014); however, the choice of strategy might also 
depend on a suspect’s belief about whether she can remember and maintain that falsehood over 
time. 
Metacognitive judgments of learning have been used in the context of fluency effects and 
in the field of education (see Rhodes, 2016). Asking for judgments of learning requires that 
participants rate their confidence that they will remember an item on a subsequent memory test. 
Given differences in how deception is conceptualized across paradigms, the first and second 
experiments of this dissertation employ a paradigm that balances experimental control and 
ecological validity while also allowing for an assessment of differences in metacognitive 
predictions and memory performance. In line with Besken (2018), the first two experiments of 
this dissertation assess differences in memory predictions based on the way in which participants 
provide deceptive responses, as well as whether volition is involved in deception (Experiment 2 
only). I use a performed-actions adaptation of the object paradigm developed by Vieira and Lane 
(2013) to assess the effect of volitional deception on subsequent memory. This paradigm 
supports the need for both internal validity, by allowing for experimental control over the types 
of lies told, and external validity, by asking participants to lie and tell the truth about actions for 
which she has performed (more similar to the position of a perpetrator in the real world). In 
general, I predicted that participants would provide higher judgments of learning when they 
provide truthful responses (compared to when they provide deceptive responses) and when they 
were allowed to choose items about which to lie or tell the truth (compared to when they are 
instructed when to do so by an experimenter). Further, I expected that when participant liars are 
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able to exert control over the items about which they lie or tell the truth, they will better 
remember their lies (e.g., Murty, DuBrow, & Davachi, 2015), compared to when lies and truths 
are selected by an experimenter. 
Consistency Across Repeated Interviews 
Inconsistencies are often treated by laypeople and professionals as indicators of 
deception. However, research suggests that the type of inconsistency is a more important 
indicator of deception than inconsistency itself (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013; Vredevelt, van 
Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Assessing between-statement consistency allows for separation of 
different types of inconsistencies that can arise between two interviews. Inconsistencies can be 
contradictory in nature, such as when a witness initially recalls the perpetrator to be blonde and 
on a later interview reports that the perpetrator had black hair. Two statements can also be 
inconsistent if information is added during a second interview that was not present during an 
initial interview statement (i.e., reminiscent), as when a witness fails to remember that a 
perpetrator wore a black baseball cap until she is brought in for a follow-up interview. Lastly, 
inconsistencies can arise when information that is provided initially is left out of a second 
statement (i.e., omitted). In this case, a witness could fail to repeat that a perpetrator was bearded 
when interviewed a second time, after providing that detail in an initial statement.  
Effects of Repeated Recall for Truth-tellers 
There is robust evidence for the beneficial effects of retrieval on the learning of old and 
new material (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Chan, Meissner, & Davis, 2018). Additionally, 
paradigms that involve repeated retrieval have been used to assess differences (or 
inconsistencies) in memory reports that occur as a result of forgetting and reminiscence (for 
review, see Roediger, Wheeler, & Rajaram, 1993). Hypermnesia refers to an overall increase in 
memory recall across two tests (Erdelyi & Becker, 1974), whereas reminiscence specifically 
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refers to the additional recall of information on a later test that was not recalled on an earlier test 
(Ballard, 1913). Thus, reminiscence must occur in order to observe hypermnesia on a second 
test. Reminiscence, however, can also occur in the absence of hypermnesia. If the amount of 
forgetting observed is greater than or equal to the amount of information added on a subsequent 
test (i.e., reminiscence), there will be no increase in the overall amount of information provided.  
Research suggests that engaging in varied retrieval can contribute to reminiscence 
(Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). According to the principle of varied retrieval, if a retrieval cue at an 
initial test differs from a retrieval cue at a subsequent test, witnesses should recall different 
information on each test. Gilbert and Fisher assessed this by asking participants to describe a 
witnessed event without instruction (free recall), or cuing participants to recall the event with a 
type of temporal cue (chronological or reverse order recall), or with a type of spatial cue 
(robber’s perspective or police officer’s perspective). After a two-day delay, participants 
provided another statement about the event. On this subsequent recall attempt, participants were 
cued to recall the event either using the same cue as in the initial interview or using a different 
temporal or spatial cue than in the initial interview. 
Gilbert and Fisher coded event statements for the amount of information provided and 
whether it was consistent or inconsistent across statements. Consistent information was present 
in both event statements. Inconsistent-contradictory items were described differently on an initial 
statement than how they were described on a subsequent statement. Inconsistent-forgotten 
information was provided in an initial statement but not recalled on a subsequent statement. 
Lastly, inconsistent-reminiscent information was provided on a subsequent statement but was not 
present in an initial statement. 
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Inconsistencies from participants cued with varied retrieval cues (e.g., asking for an 
initial statement in reverse chronological order and a subsequent statement in chronological 
order) were compared to those from participants cued without a specific retrieval cue (i.e., a free 
recall prompt). Gilbert and Fisher found that varying the retrieval cues between two event recall 
opportunities¬ increased the amount of reminiscent information reported and decreased the 
number of items that were forgotten on the second event recall. The amount of consistent and 
contradictory items that were recalled were similar.  
Gilbert and Fisher also examined the accuracy of each consistent and inconsistent item 
type. The accuracy of inconsistent-reminiscent and inconsistent-forgotten details was fairly high 
(0.87 and 0.93, respectively). Consistent details, however, were still associated with the highest 
accuracy (0.95). Few contradictory details were reported overall, but when they were reported, 
they were associated with low accuracy (0.49). Thus, inconsistencies that do not contradict a 
prior statement, including items that are added or omitted between two statements, are more 
likely to be accurate than inconsistencies that directly contradict a prior statement. 
Effects of Repeated Recall for Liars 
For guilty suspects, there are a number of different types of (in)consistency that can 
induce suspicion, including the perceived consistency within a suspect’s statement and across 
multiple statements. Inconsistencies can also arise between statements elicited from multiple 
suspects, or between a suspect’s statement and the available evidence. Interviewers can use 
strategic questioning approaches to encourage the production of some inconsistencies to 
facilitate credibility assessment. For instance, the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique can 
be used to elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies that improve an observer’s ability to detect 
deception (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014).  
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The diagnostic value of between-statement consistency (i.e., between multiple recall 
opportunities from a single suspect) is considered in this dissertation. Consistency across 
statements has been suggested to be indicative of liars who have rehearsed their statement (Vrij 
et al., 2009; Masip, Martinez, Blandon-Gitlin, Sanchez, Herrero, & Ibabe, 2018), liars who 
underestimate the extent to which forgetting occurs (i.e., stability bias; Kornell & Bjork, 2009; 
Harvey, Vrij, Hope, Leal, & Mann, 2017), and/or liars who deliberately repeat the same 
statement given previously to avoid being exposed (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). However, 
manipulating the way in which a suspect provides a statement can prevent a liar from using a 
“repeat” strategy to appear consistent.  
Liars are likely to be inconsistent when faced with varied retrieval, such as when they 
must report an event differently between multiple interviews (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012). 
During an initial interview, Leins et al. (2012) asked liars and truth-tellers to describe their 
activities in a prior phase either verbally, by providing an initial free recall and then answering 
specific questions from an interview, or pictorially, by producing a sketch drawing of the task 
room and the location of as many items as possible. After a ten-minute delay, participants 
provided the interviewer with an additional statement about their activities in the same or 
different reporting method. Truth-tellers were more consistent than liars (when only items that 
were contradictory were compared to items that were consistent); however, liars were even less 
consistent when the retrieval method differed between interviews. 
Evidence-Based Interviewing Techniques and Consistency 
When suspects are repeatedly interviewed, techniques that are employed by an 
interviewer on one occasion might inadvertently increase the likelihood of between-statement 
inconsistencies. Specifically, these techniques are often intended to increase the volume of 
information obtained from an interview (e.g., the Cognitive Interview; Fisher & Geiselman, 
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1992). If more information is provided on one occasion (regardless of its veracity), there is then 
more information to be forgotten (i.e., not repeatedly provided by a suspect) on a subsequent 
occasion. Nevertheless, proponents of a cognitive lie detection approach encourage interviewers 
to use such techniques to increase the length and verbal content of interviewees’ statements 
(Vrij, 2015), given that the most successful training protocols for lie detection and credibility 
assessment focus on such verbal content (see Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2016). 
One technique that supports memory retrieval, reverse-order recall, has been shown to 
induce inconsistencies in both liars and truth-tellers (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Hudson et al., 
2019). Hudson and colleagues examined consistency between two statements provided in close 
succession to each other (approximately 3 minutes following the conclusion of an initial 
interview). When a reverse-order recall instruction was administered, both liars and truth-tellers 
provided more omissions and fewer repetitions. Overall, truth-tellers provided more details 
across the two interviews, and specifically more reminiscent details during a second interview 
than did liars. Liars, in contrast, made significantly more omissions when a reverse-order recall 
instruction was administered during an interview, compared to when a chronological order recall 
instruction was administered. 
The current dissertation examines whether interview approaches that enhance the 
frequency of diagnostic cues to deception, such as differences in verbal content, might yield a 
corollary negative effect in diminishing the frequency of (or reducing the efficacy of) memory-
based cues to deception in truth-tellers’ accounts. For example, when being questioned about an 
event that occurred long ago, truth-tellers may not have access to an event memory due to 
forgetting, leading them to offer narratives that lack content cues to credibility. Liars, on the 
other hand, often fail to consider the effects of delay (i.e., forgetting) in the information that they 
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report and do not appropriately monitor their output to mimic honest forgetting. Truth-tellers 
interviewed following a three-week delay provided fewer details about an experienced event, 
compared to truth-tellers interviewed immediately after the event (Harvey et al., 2017). In 
contrast, liars produced equivalent amounts of detail when interviewed initially and after a delay. 
In fact, on the delayed interview, liars and truth-tellers did not differ in the amount of 
information that they provided. Thus, although truth-tellers might simply be unable to retrieve 
more information following a delay, liars might strategically provide less information in order to 
facilitate consistency across repeated interviews (i.e., to decrease the amount of information 
necessary to remember from one interview to another). 
Researchers and practitioners have advocated for the use of evidence-based interviewing 
techniques to increase cooperation and disclosure of information in investigative interviewing 
(Brandon, Wells, & Seale, 2018; Meissner, Surmon-Böhr, Oleszkiewicz, & Alison, 2017; Vrij & 
Granhag, 2014; Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). Such interviewing tactics have been assessed as 
both tools to improve the quality of an interviewee’s memory report as well as tools to magnify 
differences between liars and truth-tellers that aid lie detection. Examples include eye closure 
instructions (Perfect et al., 2008), mental context reinstatement (Smith & Vela, 2001), recalling 
an event in reverse temporal order (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull, 2008), and 
providing subjects with a “model” statement (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). 
The primary goal of these techniques is to increase the amount of information obtained 
from an interview without a commensurate decrease in accuracy; however, techniques that 
encourage a speaker to elaborate can, in some cases, lead an interviewee to provide information 
that may not be true (or information that they might be unsure of; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
Erroneous information that is provided to an interviewer as a result of such techniques could be 
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due to an interviewee reporting incorrect information (i.e., errors in describing a witnessed 
detail) or due to confabulation (i.e., errors in describing unwitnessed details). Should an 
interviewee fail to report that erroneous information on a subsequent interview (or amend that 
statement to correct an error), an interviewer could note a difference between the two statements 
and perceive the interviewee’s between-statement consistency negatively. However, an error that 
persists could become incorporated into one’s memory for what truthfully occurred (e.g., self-
generated misinformation; Pickel, 2004), irreparably affecting one’s credibility if that 
information is revealed to be inaccurate.  
In Experiment 3, I examine the potential for evidence-based interviewing tactics to foster 
the generation of inconsistencies across multiple interviews, as well as the potential detrimental 
influence of providing a false statement on memory for the truth. Two interviewing techniques (a 
memory-enhancing technique, reverse-order recall and a standard control interview, a structured 
interview) were compared to examine their influence on the production of inconsistencies across 
repeated interviews. Truth-tellers may be more inconsistent than liars because they are able to 
draw from a true memory and should thus be able to report more information than liars who will 
be fabricating or inventing an account. Liars, in contrast, may strategically aim to be consistent 
across their multiple reports and thus fail to consider (i) that evidence-based interviewing tactics 
are designed to enhance memory and facilitate information gain, and (ii) that truth-tellers’ reports 
will be affected by forgetting. As noted previously, conventional interviewing techniques were 
designed with the intent to exploit the different strategies used and misconceptions held by liars 
and truth-tellers to magnify observable differences between the two. However, of interest here is 
whether the current literature might underestimate the potential vulnerability of truth-tellers to be 
misattributed as liars when these techniques are used. 
31 
Reverse-Order Recall 
One tactic that has been evaluated as a credibility assessment tool is a reverse-order 
recall instruction (Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon, 2013; Vrij et al., 2008). After an 
interviewee has provided an initial free narrative, they are asked to recall the event once more in 
reverse chronological order. Recalling an event from multiple retrieval perspectives, in particular 
one that is counter to an initial schema-guided retrieval attempt (Geiselman & Callot, 1990), can 
allow for a previously inaccessible memory trace to be accessed (Milne & Bull, 1999) and 
therein increase the amount of information reported. Asking for an event description in reverse-
order increases cognitive load more so for liars than truth-tellers, thereby magnifying 
discriminable verbal and nonverbal behaviors between the two (Evans et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 
2008). However, when compared with a request for an open-ended narrative, recalling an event 
in reverse-order can sometimes increase confabulations and decrease overall statement accuracy 
(Dando, Ormerod, Wilcock, & Milne, 2011). Errors that are produced as a result of compliance 
with a reverse-order instruction could persist across repeated interviews, leading to further 
consequences for interviewees with respect to perceived inconsistency (Fisher et al., 2013). 
Structured Interview 
Experimental work manipulating interviewing techniques often uses a structured 
interview as an evidence-based control (see Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). The Structured 
Interview is comprised of two interview phases: an open-ended initial free recall, and a 
supplemental questioning phase (Memon, Wark, Holley, Bull, & Koehnken, 1997). Interviewees 
are first asked to freely report their narrative account, and interviewers then use the information 
from this narrative to generate follow-up questions (e.g., “tell me more about…”). The use of a 
Structured Interview standardizes the requests for an initial narrative as well as the subsequent 
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probing phase, separate from those techniques that are employed to address potential credibility 
assessment. 
Experiment 3 was designed to capture several ecologically relevant aspects with respect 
to lying in forensic interviews. Participants completed two distinct events (a scavenger hunt in 
two “areas” of campus) and then had the opportunity to choose which event they would rehearse 
truthfully (rather than be exclusively a “liar” or a “truth-teller”; Vrij, 2016). Following the event, 
they completed an initial interview with either a structured interview, a reverse-order recall 
instruction, or they were dismissed until the next session (no initial recall). Participants returned 
one week later to provide another free recall statement about the event. Finally, to assess the 
influence of lying on memory, participants were asked to truthfully recall the Encoding Phase 
events as they actually occurred in the first experiment session. I predicted that when interviewed 
with a reverse order technique, interviewees would provide more information during an initial 
interview relative to a structured interview. Relatedly, I predicted that the reverse order 
technique would also lead to more inconsistencies in the form of omissions (i.e., details present 
in an initial statement that are not repeated during a subsequent interview) for both deceptively 
described and truthfully described events. Specifically, the increase in information associated 
with the mnemonic technique presents the possibility that more information will be forgotten on 
a delayed second interview (e.g., Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991), when compared with a structured 
interview that does not employ such techniques. 
Overview of the Current Study 
There were two primary aims to this dissertation. First, to assess whether intentional 
deception (and truth-telling) affects the relationship between lying and memory for the truth. 
Second, to examine differences in between-statement consistency (and inconsistency) when 
people lie versus tell the truth. Experiments 1 and 2 offer a more experimentally controlled 
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paradigm to examine how lying affects memory, and Experiment 3 extends this research to a 
more ecologically valid context. Further, Experiments 1 and 2 allow for an assessment of 
people’s metacognitive abilities when lying and telling the truth, and specifically in Experiment 
2 the effect of volition or intentionality is examined. Volitional truth-telling is required by 
participants in Experiment 3, but it is not manipulated. Experiment 3 in particular allows for an 
assessment of how an interviewer’s approach might lead to the production of inconsistencies. In 
each experiment, memory accuracy is assessed with respect to what material was encoded–
simple performed actions in Experiment 1 and 2; key facts acquired during a scavenger hunt in 
Experiment 3. Further, the consistency of true and false statements provided one week apart are 
assessed. 
34 
CHAPTER 2.    EXPERIMENT 1 
Previous research has shown that there is a disparity between what people think they will 
remember when lying and telling the truth, compared to what they actually remember (i.e., a 
“metacognitive illusion”). That is, people predict they will remember the truth better, but on a 
subsequent memory test recall more of their lies (Besken, 2018). However, prior work has also 
shown that different types of lies differentially affect memory (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep). In 
this experiment, I explored the relationship between memory and metamemory for different 
types of lies (and truths) to assess whether a “metacognitive illusion” persists for different types 
of lies. I hypothesized to replicate the effect of veracity on memory for the truth demonstrated in 
prior work (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep), wherein people will show better memory for 
truthfully rehearsed items. Further, I hypothesized that participants would be more consistent 
across two experimental sessions when describing actions truthfully than when describing them 
deceptively. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants (26 female) from Iowa State University participated for partial 
course credit. Normal or corrected to normal vision was required. The ages of participants varied 
between 18 and 22 years of age (M = 18.83, SD = 1.11). This sample size was based on prior 
work using this paradigm (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep). 
Materials and Design 
Stimuli were a set of 48 simple objects (e.g., a marble). Participants performed actions 
with these simple objects, which were modified from the actions used in Goff and Roediger’s 
(1998) imagination inflation study (see Materials on OSF). A video camera was used to record 
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participants’ verbal responses during the Rehearsal Phase in Session 1. A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) 
x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) within-subjects design was 
used.  
Procedure 
Using a paradigm adapted from Vieira and Lane (2013) and Dianiska, Lane, et al. (in 
preparation), participants completed a two-session experiment. Session 1 comprised the Action 
Phase and Rehearsal Phase, and three days later participants returned for Session 2 which 
comprised the Test Phase (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Depiction of procedure used in Experiment 1. 
Session 1 
During the Action Phase, participants sat across a table from the experimenter. For each 
action, the experimenter set an object (e.g., a toy dog) on the table in front of the participant, read 
an action statement (e.g., “pat the toy dog”), and then began a timer. Each action was carried out 
for 15 seconds; participants were instructed to repeat performing the action for the full time. 
After the 15 seconds had passed, the experimenter stopped the timer, removed the object from 
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the table and replaced it with another object, and proceeded to the next action statement. This 
continued for a total of 24 actions in a predetermined random order. 
Participants then began the Rehearsal Phase (see Figure 5 for rehearsed item types). For 
each trial, participants were presented with an action statement on the screen (e.g., pat the toy 
dog). Some of these action statements corresponded to actions that were studied during the 
Action Phase (i.e., performed items) while others referred to actions that were not studied during 
the Action Phase (i.e., unperformed items). Below each action statement were instructions to 
either truthfully or deceptively deny having performed the action (e.g., “I did not pat the toy 
dog”) or to truthfully or deceptively describe performing the action (e.g., “There was a stuffed 
animal dog, it was white and brown, it looked like a bulldog and with my left hand I kept patting 
it on its head”).  
 
Figure 5. Item types presented in the Rehearsal Phase in Experiment 1. Items with an asterisk 
represent control items on the final test that were not rehearsed. 
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For actions that had been performed during the Action phase, participants either 
truthfully described the action as they performed it (performed truth-describe items) or lied by 
denying that they had performed that action (performed lie-deny items). For actions that had not 
been performed during the first phase, participants either truthfully denied that they performed 
the action during the first phase (unperformed truth-deny items) or lied by providing a false 
description of how they supposedly performed the action (unperformed lie-describe items). For 
each trial, participants read an action statement on the computer, turned to the camera to give 
their response, and then turned back to the computer for the next action statement. Half of these 
statements were rehearsed once during the Rehearsal Phase, while the other half appeared three 
times. Participants were instructed to keep their responses consistent for these thrice-repeated 
items. After each statement, participants provided judgments of learning (JOLs) by rating the 
likelihood that they would remember their responses on a later memory test.  
Additionally, two control item types were included in the subsequent Test Phase. These 
items had not been presented during the Rehearsal Phase: performed no-rehearsal items (actions 
that were performed during the Action Phase, but not truthfully or deceptively rehearsed in the 
Rehearsal Phase), and unperformed no-rehearsal items (actions that were neither performed nor 
rehearsed in Session 1). These items were used to assess the extent to which rehearsal affects 
correct and false recognition of actions as having been performed. 
After providing all of the rehearsal statements on camera, participants provided 
demographic information (age, sex, ethnicity) and responded to several post-experiment 
questions regarding the frequency with which they lie in everyday life (white lies, serious lies), 
how difficult they found it to provide the different types of rehearsal statements (truthful 
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descriptions, false descriptions, truthful denials, false denials), and how believable they think 
they are when lying (in the experiment, in everyday life). 
Session 2 
Three days later, participants returned to complete the third and final phase of the 
experiment, the Test Phase. Participants’ memory for the performed actions was first assessed 
via a 48-item source memory test. A series of action statements appeared on the computer 
screen, and participants indicated whether and how they encountered the action in Session 1. For 
each action, participants selected from response options that represented whether an action was 
performed, whether it was rehearsed, and if so, if it was rehearsed truthfully or deceptively. 
Participants made their source test decision from one of six possible options: 1) I performed this 
action but denied performing it on camera, 2) I performed this action and truthfully described it 
on camera, 3) I performed this action but did not talk about it on camera, 4) I did not perform this 
action and truthfully said so on camera, 5) I did not perform this action but falsely described it on 
camera, and 6) I did not perform this action and did not talk about it on camera.  
Following the source test, participants completed a test regarding the descriptions they 
provided in the first session. For each described item, participants were asked to type the exact 
description that they provided to the camera during the Rehearsal Phase. Participants’ videotaped 
responses to each described action statement during the Rehearsal Phase were transcribed and 
coded for the presence of action and object features, as well as the correspondence between the 
transcribed descriptions and the descriptions provided one week later. Participants were then 
debriefed and dismissed from the experiment. 
Coding of Description Statements 
Participant responses from the Rehearsal Phase were videotaped and transcribed. Based 
on the transcripts of these rehearsal recordings, two coders counted the number of features 
39 
participants used to describe each action performed in the Action Phase. Features were counted if 
they described what the object looked like (e.g., color, size, type of material) as well as how the 
participant completed the action (e.g., which hand was used, movement, number of times). 
Features that were a part of the action statement were not counted. For example, for the action 
statement, “bounce the ball,” a participant’s response of, “I held the blue ball in my right hand 
and bounced it on the table” would have four features: “held,” “blue,” “in my right hand,” and 
“on the table.” 
Descriptions provided during the Rehearsal Phase were next compared to the typed-out 
responses that participants provided during the descriptions test. The features present in the 
descriptions test were coded similarly, and further classified as i) repeated between the Rehearsal 
Phase and the descriptions test (consistent details); ii) contradictory to features present in the 
Rehearsal Phase statement (contradictory details); iii) new details that were not previously 
mentioned during the Rehearsal Phase (new details); and iv) features from Rehearsal Phase 
statements that were not said during the descriptions test (omitted details). The primary 
dependent variable was the number of consistent features that were remembered and provided on 
the descriptions test.  
Results 
All materials and data necessary to produce the statistical results are hosted on OSF 
(https://osf.io/u875g/?view_only=88e413644c114d90a7969e4429f8bd43). Descriptive statistics 
can be found in Tables 2 and 3. In the following sections I begin by assessing the effects of the 
type and veracity of rehearsal, as well as whether rehearsal was repeated, on participants’ 
predicted memory performance (JOLs) and then move on to assess these same effects on actual 
memory performance on the source memory test. Next, I examine differences in the consistency 
of described action statements based on veracity and repetition. I then examine the effect of 
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rehearsed item types on accurate and false memory for having performed an action. Finally, I 
explore the effect of the type and veracity of rehearsal on the relationship between memory 
predictions and actual performance with Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations. 
 
Figure 6. Predicted memory performance (JOLs) and actual memory performance (source test 
accuracy) per item type, Experiment 1. Errors bars represent standard errors. Bars in this graph 
are collapsed across the Repetition variable. 
Predicted Memory Performance 
Predicted memory performance and actual memory performance were assessed as 
proportions (see Figure 6, lighter bars). A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, 
Describe) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the average 
ratings of predicted memory performance for each item type. For items that were repeated three 
times, I used the mean of the three JOL ratings. The pattern of results remains the same whether 
the first rating, third rating, or mean of all three ratings are used. 
41 
There were significant main effects of Repetition (F(1, 35) = 4.14, p = .049, d = 0.34 
[0.00, 0.67]) and Veracity (F(1, 35) = 14.96, p < .01, d = 0.65 [0.28, 1.00]). People predicted 
they would remember items that were rehearsed multiple times (M = .71, SE = .03) better than 
items that were rehearsed only once (M = .69, SE = .32). Further, in line with Besken (2018), 
people predicted that they would remember items that they rehearsed truthfully (M = .73, SE = 
.03) better than items that they lied about (M = .67, SE = .04). This main effect of Veracity was 
qualified by a significant interaction between Veracity and Rehearsal Type (F(1, 35) = 11.61, p = 
.002, ηp2 = 0.25). For items that participants described, people predicted they would remember 
their truthful descriptions (M = .75, SE = .03) better than false descriptions (M = .64, SE = .04), 
t(35) = 4.25, p < .001, d = 0.71 [0.34, 1.07]. However, there was no difference in predicted 
memory performance for false denials (M = .70, SE = .04) compared to truthful denials (M = .72, 
SE = .03), t(35) = 1.01, p = .32, d = 0.17 [-0.16, 0.50]. All other effects were not statistically 
significant, F’s < 3.65, p’s > .07. 
Actual Memory Performance 
Source test responses were considered accurate if the participant correctly categorized 
what happened with that action in both the Action Phase and Rehearsal Phase (e.g., a participant 
correctly associating an item that was performed and truthfully described once with response 
option 2, “I performed this action and truthfully described it on camera”). To compare source test 
accuracy for the different item types, a 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, 
Describe) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean 
proportion of accurate source test responses for all item types that were rehearsed (Figure 6, 
darker bars). See Table 2 for the full breakdown of response selections. 
Overall, participants were more accurate on the source test for items that were described 
(M = .82, SE = .02) than denied (M = .39, SE = .04), F(1, 35) = 115.99, p < .001, d = 1.80 [1.26, 
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2.32], as well as for items that were rehearsed three times (M = .70, SE = .03) than one time (M = 
.51, SE = .03), F(1, 35) = 32.14, p < .001, d = 0.95 [0.55, 1.33]. As in prior work (Dianiska, 
Lane, et al., in prep; Vieira & Lane, 2013), there was a significant interaction between Veracity 
and Rehearsal Type (F(1, 35) = 5.51, p = .025, ηp2 = 0.14). For items that were described, source 
accuracy was greater for truthful descriptions (M = .89, SE = .02) than false descriptions (M = 
.76, SE = .04), p = .002, t(35) = 3.42, p = .002, d = 0.57 [0.21, 0.92]. There was no difference in 
memory accuracy, however, for truthful denials (M = .38, SE = .05) compared to false denials (M 
= .40, SE = .04), t(35) = 0.29, p = .78, d = 0.05 [-0.28, 0.37]. All other effects were not 
statistically significant, F’s < 3.65, p’s > .06. 
Consistency 
 
Figure 7. Number of consistent features from Rehearsal Phase provided on the Descriptions test 
based on description type, Experiment 1. Errors bars represent standard errors.. 
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Consistency data from three participants could not be assessed due to camera errors that 
prevented recording of Rehearsal Phase (n = 2) or due to incorrect completion of the descriptions 
test (n = 1). A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on the number of features consistently remembered on the descriptions test (see 
Figure 7). 
There were significant main effects of Veracity (F(1, 32) = 7.22, p = .01, d = 0.50 [0.14, 
0.85], and Repetition (F(1, 32) = 70.78, p < .001, d = 1.47 [0.97, 1.95]. On the descriptions test, 
people remembered more consistent features for actions that had been rehearsed truthfully (M = 
3.02, SE = .20) rather than lied about (M = 2.67, SE =.21), as well as for actions that had been 
rehearsed repeatedly (M = 3.31, SE = .20) rather than once (M = 2. 39, SE = .20). The interaction 
between Veracity and Repetition was not significant, F(1, 32) = 0.04, p = .85. 
Accurate and False Memory for Performing Actions 
 
Figure 8. Accurate recognition of a performed action (lie-deny, truth-describe) as having been 
performed based on rehearsal type, Experiment 1. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
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Source performance was assessed in two additional ways: 1) the rate of accurately 
remembering having performed an action during the Action Phase, and 2) the rate of falsely 
remembering having performed an action during the Action Phase, based on response selections 
of “I performed this action but denied performing it on camera”, “I performed this action and 
truthfully described it on camera”, and “I performed this action but did not talk about it on 
camera”. See Table 2 for descriptive statistics. 
A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the mean proportion of accurate “performed” responses (i.e., accurate recognition; 
see Figure 8). There was a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 35) = 8.63, p = .01, d = 0.49 
[0.14, 0.83]. Accurate recognition of an action as having been performed was significantly 
higher for truthfully (described) actions (M = .99, SE = .01) than for actions that were lied about 
(i.e., denied; M = .95, SE = .01). Neither the main effect of Repetition (F(1, 35) = 0.69, p = .41, d 
= 0.14 [-0.19, 0.47])) nor the interaction between Veracity and Repetition (F(1, 35) = 0.05, p = 
.83, ηp2 < .01) were significant. 
Pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine the effect of each performed and 
rehearsed item type (i.e., performed lie-deny once, performed lie-deny thrice, performed truth-
describe once, performed truth-describe thrice) on accurate recognition rates, relative to the 
control items that were performed and not rehearsed. Accurate recognition was significantly 
higher for items that were truthfully described once (M = .99, SE = .01) compared to the 
performed no-rehearsal items (M = .89, SE = .02), t(35) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.73 [0.36, 1.10], 
and significantly higher for items that were truthfully described thrice (M = .98, SE = .01) 
compared to the performed no-rehearsal items, t(35) = 4.12, p < .001, d = 0.69 [0.32, 1.06]. After 
correcting for multiple comparisons, there was no difference for items that were falsely denied 
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once (M = .95, SE = .02; t(35) = 2.26, p = .03; d = 0.38 [0.04, 0.71]) or falsely denied thrice (M = 
.94, SE = .02; t(35) = 2.69, p = .01; d = 0.45 [0.10, 0.79]) compared to the no-rehearsal control 
items. 
 
Figure 9. False recognition of an unperformed action (lie-describe, truth-deny) as having been 
performed based on rehearsal type, Experiment 1. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the mean proportion of inaccurate “performed” responses (i.e., false recognition; 
see Figure 9). There was not a significant main effect of either Veracity, F(1, 35) = 3.50, p = .07, 
d = 0.31 [-0.03, 0.64], or Repetition, F(1, 35) = 0.09, p = .77, d = 0.05 [-0.28, 0.38], nor an 
interaction between the two, F(1, 35) = 0.11, p = .74, ηp2 < .01. Pairwise comparisons to examine 
the effect of each unperformed and rehearsed item type (i.e., unperformed truth-deny once, 
unperformed truth-deny thrice, unperformed lie-describe once, unperformed lie-describe thrice) 
on false recognition rates, relative to the control items that were neither performed nor rehearsed, 
revealed no significant differences (t’s < 1.62, p’s > .11). 
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Correlation between Predicted and Actual Performance 
 Pearson correlations were computed to compare the relationship between average 
predicted memory ratings and source accuracy for each item type. There was a small, 
nonsignificant positive correlation between predicted and actual memory performance for actions 
that were falsely denied once (r(35) = .08, p = .65), falsely denied thrice (r(35) = .08, p = .64), 
truthfully described once (r(35) = .03, p = .88), truthfully described thrice (r(35) = .28, p = .10), 
and truthfully denied thrice (r(35) = .02, p = .89). There was a small, nonsignificant negative 
correlation between predicted and actual memory performance for actions that were falsely 
described once (r(35) = -.27, p = .11), falsely described thrice (r(35) = -.16, p = .34), and 
truthfully denied once (r(35) = -.06, p = .72). 
Resolution 
Resolution refers to relative accuracy, or the degree to which participants gave higher 
JOL ratings to items that were correct on the final test, and lower JOLs to items that were 
incorrect on the final test. A resolution measure, Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation, was 
computed between prediction ratings and source test performance for each subject separately for 
actions that were rehearsed truthfully and deceptively, once and thrice, as well as for actions that 
were rehearsed by denial or description. It was not possible to compute a gamma correlation in 
all cases, given that some participants failed to use a sufficient range of values when providing 
JOLs or were accurate on all items on the final test (n = 3). In these few instances, cases were 
excluded in lieu of having values imputed to account for incomplete data.  
Because of small cells, I focused on comparing relative predictive accuracy for actions 
that were associated with main effects of either veracity (truths vs. lies), repetition (once vs. 
thrice) or rehearsal type (deny vs. describe). Paired-samples t-test were conducted to compare 
participants’ resolution separately for lies and truths, statements that had been rehearsed once or 
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three times, as well as for statements that had been denied or described. Average resolution for 
truthfully rehearsed items (M = .13, SE = .09) was greater than resolution for actions that 
participants lied about (M = -.15, SE = .08), t(32) = 2.48, p = .02, d = 0.43 [0.07, 0.79]. However, 
there was no significant difference in resolution for items that were rehearsed once (M = .04, SE 
= .09) compared to three times (M = -.01, SE = .08), t(31) = 0.13, p = .90, d = 0.02 [-0.32, 0.37]; 
nor for denials (M = .07, SE = .08) compared to descriptions (M = .20, SE = .10), t(23) = 1.18, p 
= .25, d = 0.24 [-0.17, 0.65]. 
Summary of Findings 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the act of lying does affect memory 
performance. Here, lying about an action led to lower source accuracy for how the action was 
encountered previously, especially when people lied by providing a description. Actions that 
were lied about were also associated with less accurate recognition for the action having been 
performed. With respect to actions that were described, people remembered fewer features of 
lied-about action descriptions than features of actions they had truthfully described. Finally, 
lying by describing an action that was not performed tended to inflate incorrect recognition of 
that action as having been performed – despite this effect being marginally significant, the effect 
size was in line with prior work using this paradigm (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in preparation). 
The current findings suggest that a disparity between predicted and actual memory 
performance may not be apparent for all types of lies and truths. Rather, descriptions and denials 
appear to differ in their impact on not only a person’s memory for lies and truths, but also what 
they believe about their memory. As in prior work (Besken, 2018), when people provided 
statements about actions that had (or had not) been performed, they predicted that they would 
remember their truthful statements better on a later memory test. In terms of actual memory 
performance, accuracy on a source memory test was also greater for actions that had been 
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rehearsed truthfully. This is counter to what would have been expected based upon the 
“metacognitive illusion” observed by Besken (2018) – if there was such a disparity between 
predicted and actual performance, actions that were rehearsed deceptively should have been 
associated with greater memory accuracy. Therefore, the extent to which predicted and actual 
memory for truths and lies are discrepant may depend on the type of statement being provided. 
The inflation of predicted memory performance ratings for truthful statements and for 
denials may be rooted in the notion of fluency (Oppenheimer, 2008). When people truthfully 
describe or deny an action, they can rely on their memory of the experience to craft their 
response. In contrast, lying often requires more time to produce a response (see Suchotzki et al., 
2017) and is more cognitively demanding (e.g., Vrij et al., 2008) – making it more effortful or 
more disfluent, relative to telling the truth. Brief denials require less effort to produce than 
elaborated descriptions and are thus more fluently processed. Items that are processed more 
fluently tend to receive higher JOLs (e.g., Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003). 
Experiment 1 demonstrated several boundary conditions associated with differences in 
people’s memory and metamemory for lies and truths. However, as noted in the introduction, 
one aspect of deception that is often not apparent in experimental work is the notion of volition 
or intentionality. Further, although the same patterns of memory performance were observed as 
in prior studies using this paradigm (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep; Vieira & Lane, 2013), not all 
effects reached statistical significance. Experiment 2 was conducted primarily to examine the 
effect of volition on memory for lies and truths. A subsidiary aim of Experiment 2 was to explore 
whether discrepancies between Experiment 1 and prior work might be due to the provision of 
metacognitive judgments inviting reactivity (i.e., changes in behavior when performing 
metacognitive judgments; e.g., Janes, Rivers, & Dunlosky, 2018). 
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Table 2  
Experiment 1 Mean Proportion of Source Responses for Each Item Type 
  Response Options 
Item Type 
“I 
performed 
this action 
but denied 
performing 
it on 
camera” 
“I 
performed 
this action 
and 
truthfully 
described it 
on camera” 
“I 
performed 
this action 
but did not 
talk about 
it on 
camera” 
“I did not 
perform this 
action and 
truthfully 
said so on 
camera” 
“I did not 
perform this 
action but 
falsely 
described it 
on camera” 
“I did not 
perform this 
action and 
did not talk 
about it on 
camera” 
Performed Lie Deny Once .30 (.05) .11 (.03) .54 (.05) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .03 (.01) 
Performed Lie Deny Thrice .49 (.06) .17 (.04) .29 (.05) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) 
Performed Truth Describe Once .06 (.02) .85 (.03) .09 (.03) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.01) 
Performed Truth Describe Thrice .02 (.01) .93 (.03) .03 (.03) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.00) 
Performed No Rehearsal .04 (.01) .02 (.01) .82 (.03) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .08 (.02) 
Unperformed Truth Deny Once .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .04 (.01) .26 (.05) .09 (.03) .60 (.05) 
Unperformed Truth Deny Thrice .01 (.01) .03 (.01) .01 (.01) .51 (.06) .18 (.04) .26 (.05) 
Unperformed Lie Describe Once .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .04 (.02) .12 (.03) .65 (.05) .15 (.04) 
Unperformed Lie Describe Thrice .00 (.04) .08 (.00) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .86 (.04) .02 (.02) 
Unperformed No Rehearsal .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .03 (.01) .05 (.01) .01 (.01) .90 (.02) 
 
Note. Values for correct source responses are in boldface. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
50 
Table 3  
Experiment 1 Descriptive Statistics  
 JOL Ratings 
Recognition as 
“Performed” 
Total Details - 
Rehearsal 
Total Details - 
Descriptions Test 
Number of 
Consistent Details 
Item Type Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Performed Lie Deny Once .70 .04 .95 .02 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Performed Lie Deny Thrice .70 .03 .94 .02 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Performed Truth Describe Once .75 .03 .99 .01 5.15 .03 4.13 .30 2.64 .21 
Performed Truth Describe Thrice .76 .03 .98 .01 6.37 .36 4.73 .31 3.47 .23 
Performed No Rehearsal -- -- .89 .02 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Unperformed Truth Deny Once .71 .04 .05 .02 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Unperformed Truth Deny Thrice .73 .03 .05 .02 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Unperformed Lie Describe Once .62 .04 .08 .03 4.88 .38 3.45 .29 2.25 .22 
Unperformed Lie Describe Thrice .66 .03 .10 .03 6.25 .38 4.14 .26 3.15 .22 
Unperformed No Rehearsal -- -- .04 .02 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Note. Values for correct “performed” responses on the source test (i.e., accurate recognition) are in boldface
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CHAPTER 3.    EXPERIMENT 2 
Here I examined how a volitional act of deception affects one’s memory for their lies, as 
well as a potential mechanism for how volitional deception affects memory. Participants 
completed an adaptation of the paradigm used in the Experiment 1. Some participants were 
permitted to choose when they lied or told the truth (volitional participants). Other participants 
were yoked to volitional participants and were instructed when and how to lie based on the 
choices made by their yoked participant (instructed participants). After providing each lie or 
truth statement, some participants moved on to the next trial and some were asked to predict the 
likelihood that they would remember having lied (or told the truth) on a later memory test (a 
metacognitive judgment of learning or JOL; Rhodes, 2016). Recent research has shown that the 
act of making JOLs can influence subsequent memory performance (e.g., Mitchum, Kelley, & 
Fox, 2016). Therefore, manipulating whether participants provide JOLs allowed for an 
examination of whether metacognitive monitoring influences subsequent memory performance, 
and whether this was particularly so when participants lied or told the truth with volition. 
Following a delay, participants’ memory for the original experience was assessed with a 
combined recognition and source test. 
Hypotheses 
H1a: Participants will provide higher judgments of learning for items that are truthfully 
rehearsed rather than deceptively rehearsed, regardless of statement type. 
This prediction aligns with prior studies that assess the influence of lying on 
metamemory (Besken, 2018; Experiment 1, this dissertation). Specifically, people consistently 
predicted that they would remember truthful responses more than their lies (ds ranging from 0.68 
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to 1.12 for Experiments 1- 4 in Besken, 2018; d = 0.65 in Experiment 1 above). I expect to 
replicate this pattern. 
H1b: Participants will provide higher judgments of learning for items that are denied 
rather than described, regardless of veracity. 
This prediction is based on the relative fluency of, or ease of producing, denials 
compared to descriptions (Oppenheimer, 2008). Based on participant self-reports, descriptions 
are more difficult to produce than denials (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep; Vieira & Lane, 2013). 
Further, particularly for deceptively rehearsed statements, participants in Experiment 1 predicted 
higher memory performance for false denials over false descriptions. Thus, I expect that 
participants will be sensitive to the relative perceived ease of generating different rehearsal types 
and give higher JOLs to denials rather than descriptions. 
H1c: Participants will provide higher judgments of learning in the Volition-Present 
conditions than Volition-Absent conditions. 
This prediction is borne out of the potential for the act of choosing to inflate predictions 
of memory performance through the sheer act of choosing. Though I do not have specific 
predictions as to which specific items will be chosen to be lied about during the Rehearsal Phase, 
one potential selection method that participants may use is to lie about items that are relatively 
more distinctive or (subjectively) more memorable than others. Thus, participants may give 
higher ratings of later memory performance to items that they selected to rehearse further. 
H2a: Participants will have higher memory accuracy when they exercise volition over the 
items about which they lie and tell the truth compared to when the lies and truths are instructed 
by the experimenter, and this should be true especially for deceptively rehearsed statements. 
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This prediction is borne out of findings in the education domain regarding the self-choice 
effect. When respondents are able to exert control over the items about which they will lie or tell 
the truth, I predict that they will show enhanced source memory performance (e.g., Murty, 
DuBrow, & Davachi, 2015), compared to when lies and truths are selected by an experimenter. 
Further, I predict that this will benefit memory more for lies than truths. 
H2b: Participants will have higher memory accuracy when providing metacognitive 
judgments of learning compared to when these judgments are not provided, regardless of item 
type.  
A main effect of JOLs is expected should the act of providing a judgment of learning 
change how participant process or attend to the rehearsed items. This could be due to JOLs 
directing attention to easier items (Janes et al., 2018) or due to differential processing of the 
rehearsed items when JOLs are provided (e.g., Dougherty, Scheck, Nelson, & Narens, 2005). 
Overall, I expect that the provision of metacognitive judgments will enhance memory relative to 
when participants do not think critically about their future memory performance. 
H2c: Participants will be more accurate when retrieving descriptions rather than denials, 
particularly for truthful descriptions. 
Relative to denying an action, describing an action involves additional constructive 
processes required to create a realistic account (e.g., Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2014). 
Therefore, more elaborated descriptions should increase the amount of available perceptual, 
contextual, and mental operations that can be used to correctly attribute the source of a memory 
(Johnson et al., 1993). This two-way interaction between Veracity and Rehearsal has also been 
observed in prior studies using the actions paradigm (Experiment 1; see also Dianiska, Lane, et 
al., in preparation). 
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H3: The proportion of consistent details in participant descriptions will be higher for 
participants who choose items to describe truthfully and deceptively, compared to when 
instructed to describe an item truthfully or deceptively by an experimenter. 
If volition is related to improved metacognitive capabilities (e.g. Kornell & Metcalfe, 
2006) then participants might exhibit better memory for the descriptions that they provided after 
having chosen to do so. 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 136 undergraduate students (82 female) from Iowa State University participated 
in Experiment 2 in exchange for course credit. Three participants failed to return for Session 2, 
leaving 133 participants who successfully completed both sessions. The ages of participants 
varied between 18 and 31 years of age (M = 19.43, SD = 1.80). Fifteen participants identified as 
non-native speakers; however, non-native speakers were included in the final analyses as their 
inclusion did not change the results. A power analysis determined a total sample of n = 112 
would be sufficient to detect a small within-between interaction effect (f = .15) to achieve power 
of .90 with an alpha value of .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). This power analysis 
was based on the expected effect of Veracity x Volition, given the size of the main effect of 
Veracity in prior work (ds between 0.30 to 0.48 in Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep) in concert with 
an expected small-to-medium influence of Volition (as found in Hudson et al., 2019).  Due to 
computer errors, some data from Session 1 is missing for four participants who completed the 
full experiment, and data from Session 2 was lost for one participant. 
Materials and Design 
Stimuli were the same set of 48 simple objects used in Experiment 1 that participants 
used to perform actions. A 2 (Volition: Instructed, Volitional) x 2 (JOL: Absent, Present) x 2 
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(Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) mixed design was used. Volition 
and JOLs were manipulated between-subjects, while Veracity and Rehearsal Type were 
manipulated within-subjects.  
Procedure 
Participants were run individually across two sessions conducted one week apart. The 
first session comprised the Action Phase and the Rehearsal Phase, and the second session 
comprised the Test Phase (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 10. Depiction of procedure used in Experiment 2. 
Session 1 
Participants first completed the Action Phase as in Experiment 1. Participants performed 
24 simple interactions with objects for 15 seconds each.  Next, participants began the Rehearsal 
Phase (see Figure 11 for rehearsed item types). During this phase, participants were told that they 
would lie or tell the truth about actions that they had just performed, as well as actions that they 
had not performed. To motivate participants to lie or tell the truth convincingly, participants were 
told that another group of people would watch their videotaped responses and rate them on 
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believability, with the person rated most believable winning a $50 reward. In reality, all 
participants were entered into a random drawing for the reward. 
 
Figure 11. Item types presented in the Rehearsal Phase in Experiment 2. Items with an asterisk 
represent control items on the final test that were not rehearsed. 
For studied actions, participants either lied by denying performing the action or told the 
truth by accurately describing the actions as if they had performed them. For unstudied actions, 
participants either lied by describing the actions as if they had performed them or told the truth 
by denying performing that action. Participants were randomly assigned to either a volitional or 
instructed between-subjects condition. For all participants, an action statement was presented on 
the screen (see Figure 10, Rehearsal Phase panel). Participants in the volitional condition were 
shown the action statement (e.g., “pat the toy dog”) and then exerted their volition by selecting 
“Lie” or “Truth.” After making their selection, the participants were shown instructions for how 
to either lie or tell the truth on that trial (e.g., “LIE by saying that you did not pat the toy dog”). 
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Participants in the instructed condition were yoked to volitional participants such that the items 
for which they were instructed to lie and tell the truth were chosen by a participant in the 
volitional condition. In the instructed conditions, participants were shown the action statement 
and then instructions for how to lie or tell the truth about the action.  
Participants were also randomly assigned to a JOL Absent versus Present condition to 
account for the potential for reactivity when asking people to make JOLs. In the JOL-Present 
condition, after providing a response to the camera for each action statement, participants rated 
the likelihood that they will remember that they lied (or told the truth) about that action on a 
subsequent memory test on a scale from 0 to 100. Those in the JOL-Absent condition did not 
complete these ratings.  
After providing all of the rehearsal statements on camera, participants provided 
demographic information (age, sex, ethnicity) and responded to several post-experiment 
questions regarding the frequency with which they lie in everyday life (white lies, serious lies), 
how difficult they found it to provide the different types of rehearsal statements (truthful 
descriptions, false descriptions, truthful denials, false denials), as well as how believable they 
think they are when lying (in the experiment, in everyday life). Finally, participants in the 
volitional condition responded to an open-ended prompt assessing their strategy in selecting 
items to lie or tell the truth about. All participants will then be dismissed from Session 1. 
Session 2 
One week later, participants completed a 48-item recognition and source test. For each 
action statement, participants indicated how they encountered the action in Session 1 by 
responding to two statements. First, participants were asked to respond “yes” or “no” about their 
memory for the action: “Did you perform the action?”. Depending on their response, participants 
chose from one of three response options assessing their memory for rehearsal. If participants 
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indicated “yes” they did perform the action, they were shown the options: “I lied by describing 
the action on camera,” “I told the truth by denying performing the action on camera,” or “I did 
not talk about this action on camera.” If participants indicated “no” they did not perform the 
action, they were shown the options: “I lied by denying performing the action on camera,” “I told 
the truth by describing the action on camera,” or “I did not talk about this action on camera.” 
Following the source test, participants completed a test over the descriptions they 
provided in the first session. For each described item, participants were instructed to type in the 
exact description that they gave to the camera during the Rehearsal Phase. After typing out each 
description, participants provided a measure of their confidence in that description on a 3-point 
confidence scale. After completing the source test and the descriptions test, participants 
responded to a post-experiment questionnaire assessing whether they rehearsed or discussed the 
experiment since completing Session 1. Participants were then debriefed and dismissed from the 
study. 
Results 
All materials and data necessary to produce the statistical results are hosted on OSF 
(https://osf.io/u875g/?view_only=88e413644c114d90a7969e4429f8bd43). Descriptive statistics 
can be found in Tables 4 and 5. The following results are separated by whether they were 
hypothesized (and pre-registered) or exploratory. Below, I begin by assessing the effects of the 
type of rehearsal and the ability to exert volition on participants’ predicted memory performance 
(JOLs). I then assess the effect of the type of rehearsal, ability to exert volition and the provision 
of JOLs on actual memory performance on the final memory test. Next, I examine differences in 
consistency of described action statements based on veracity, volition, and JOL conditions.  
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Hypothesized Analyses 
Primary hypotheses were pre-registered on Open Science Framework (OSF) prior to 
analysis. When null results are found for the pre-registered hypotheses, I provide Bayes Factors 
(BF01) to discuss the strength of the observed evidence for a null effect.  
 
Figure 12. Predicted memory performance (JOLs) and actual memory performance (source test 
accuracy) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Predicted Memory Performance 
During Session 1, participants in the JOL-Present conditions predicted their ability to 
remember a response on a later memory test on a scale from 0 to 100 (see Figure 12, lighter 
bars). A 2 (Volition: Instructed, Volitional) x 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, 
Describe) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the average judgment of learning (JOL) rating for 
each item type, with Volition as a between-subjects variable and Veracity and Rehearsal Type as 
within-subjects variables. Overall, I expected to see main effects of Veracity (H1a), Rehearsal 
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Type (H1b), and Volition (H1c), such that participants would provide higher JOLs for truthfully-
rehearsed statements, higher JOLs for denied responses, and higher JOLs when they could 
choose the items about which to lie and tell the truth. 
There was a significant main effect of Veracity (F(1, 65) = 29.53 p < .001, d = 0.66 [0.40, 
0.92]) and Rehearsal Type (F(1, 65) = 7.56, p = .01, d = 0.34 [0.09, 0.58]). In support of H1a, 
people predicted they would remember items that they rehearsed truthfully (M = .72, SE = .02) 
better than items that they lied about (M = .64, SE = .03). Further, people predicted they would 
remember their described statements (M = .70, SE = .02) better than their denied statements (M = 
.67, SE = .03). This is opposite, however, to what was expected based on the fluency literature 
(H1b). These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between Veracity and 
Rehearsal Type (F(1, 65) = 38.48, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.37). People again predicted they would 
remember their truthful descriptions (M = .77, SE = .02) better than false descriptions (M = .62, 
SE = .03), t(66) = 7.67, p < .001, d = 0.94 [0.65, 1.22]. However, there was no difference in 
predicted memory performance for true denials (M = .67, SE = .03) compared to false denials (M 
= .67, SE = .03), t(66) = 0.25, p = .80, d = 0.03 [-0.21, 0.27]. 
In contrast to H1c, there was no significant main effect of Volition, F(1, 65) = 2.11, p = 
.15, d = 0.36 [-0.13, 0.84], BF01 = 1.16. Participants did not provide significantly higher JOLs 
based on whether they were able to choose when to lie or tell the truth (M = .72, SE = .03) or if 
they were instructed when to lie or tell the truth (M = .65, SE = .04). An estimated BF01 suggests 
that the data are 1.16 times more likely under the observed model with only main effects of 
Veracity, Statement Type, and an interaction between the two, than under the hypothesized 
model with Volition as a main effect. This suggests that the null effect is a product of an 
underpowered study to detect a small effect, rather than a true null effect of volition. 
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Actual Memory Performance 
During Session 2, participants completed a 48-item memory test. For each action 
statement, participants responded to two questions assessing their interaction with an action 
during Session 1 – one assessing their memory for performing the action (a yes/no question, 
“Did you perform the action?”), and one assessing their memory for how they rehearsed the 
action on camera (selected from one of three response options). Responses on this test were 
considered accurate if participants were correct in classifying an action as performed (or not 
performed), as well as how they rehearsed the action during the first session. See Table 4 for 
response choice descriptive statistics, collapsed across between-subjects conditions. 
A 2 (Volition: Instructed, Volitional) x 2 (JOL: Absent, Present) x 2 (Veracity: Lie, 
Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the proportion 
of accurate memory test responses (see Figure 12, darker bars). I expected to see an interaction 
between Volition and Veracity (H2a), such that participants would be more accurate, particularly 
for deceptive statements, when they could choose which items they would provide lies and 
truths. I further predicted a main effect of JOLs (H2b), expecting that the act of providing JOLs 
would affect how participants process test items. Lastly, I expected to replicate the interaction 
between Veracity and Rehearsal Type (H2c), wherein source accuracy would be greater for 
descriptions than denials, especially for truthful descriptions. 
In contrast to expectations (H2a, H2b), there was no significant interaction between 
Volition and Veracity, F(1, 127) = 0.03, p = .87, ηp2 < 0.01, BF01 = 30.66 ; nor was there a 
significant main effect of providing JOLs, F(1, 127) = 0.99, p = .32, d = 0.17 [-0.17, 0.52], BF01 
= 3.48. There was, however, a significant interaction between Veracity and Rehearsal Type, F(1, 
127) = 116.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, partially supporting H2c. For actions that were described, 
accuracy was higher for truthful descriptions (M = .76, SE = .02) than false descriptions (M = 
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.55, SE = .02), p < .001, t(130) = 9.50, p < .001, d = 0.83 [0.63, 1.03]. The opposite pattern was 
found for actions that had been denied – false denials (M = .40, SE = .02) were associated with 
higher accuracy on the memory test compared to true denials (M = .23, SE = .02), t(130) = 6.89, 
p < .001, d = -0.60 [-0.79, -0.42]. 
Additionally, there was a significant effect of Rehearsal Type, F(1, 127) = 223.02, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .64. Source accuracy was greater for actions that had been described (M = .66, SE = 
.02) than for actions that had been denied (M = .31, SE = .02; d = 1.29 [1.06, 1.52]). Finally, 
there was a significant three-way interaction between Rehearsal Type, JOLs, and Volition, F(1, 
127) = 3.98, p = .05, ηp2 = .03. Follow-up comparisons were conducted to assess the effect of 
providing JOLs on accuracy for denials and descriptions separately based on Volition. For 
volitional participants, there was only a significant main effect of Rehearsal Type (F(1, 64) = 
120.21, p < .001, d = 1.37 [1.03, 1.70]). Source accuracy for participants who could choose when 
to lie and tell the truth was greater for actions that were described (M = .66, SE = .02) rather than 
denied (M = .33, SE = .02). Neither the main effect of JOLs (F(1, 64) = 0.40, p = .53, d = 0.16 [-
0.33, 0.64]), nor the interaction between JOLs and Rehearsal Type (F(1, 64) = 0.43, p = .51, ηp2 
= .01) were significant. Instructed participants similarly showed a main effect of Rehearsal Type, 
F(1, 63) = 104.89, p < .001, d = 1.23 [0.90, 1.55]. Accuracy was greater for actions that were 
described (M = .65, SE = .03) rather than denied (M = .29, SE = .03). Further, there was a 
significant interaction between JOL and Statement Type, F(1, 63) = 4.28, p = .04, ηp2 = .06. 
Instructed participants who did not provide JOLs showed a greater difference in accuracy for 
denials (Mdeny = .18, SEdeny = .03) than descriptions (Mdescribe = .70, SEdescribe = .04; d = 1.50 [0.98, 
2.01]), when compared to instructed participants who did provide JOLs (Mdeny = .31, SEdeny = 
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.04; Mdescribe = .60, SEdescribe = .04; d = 1.03 [0.61, 1.45]), No other effects from the omnibus test 
were significant, F’s < 3.41, p’s > .07. 
Consistency 
 
Figure 13. Number of consistent features from Rehearsal Phase provided on the Descriptions 
test based on Veracity, Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Consistency data from 18 participants could not be calculated due to camera errors that 
prevented recording of Rehearsal Phase statements (n = 11), or due to incorrect completion of the 
descriptions test (n = 7). A 2 (Volition: Absent, Present) x 2 (JOLs: Absent, Present) x 2 
(Veracity: Lie, Truth) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the number of features consistently 
remembered on the Descriptions test (see Figure 13). Supporting hypothesis H3, there was a 
significant main effect of Veracity (F(1, 109) = 47.91, p < .001, d = 0.67 [0.46, 0.87]). On the 
descriptions test, people remembered more features for actions that had been rehearsed truthfully 
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(M = 1.77, SE = .10) rather than lied about (M = 1.29, SE = .08). No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, F’s < 2.29, p's > .13.  
Exploratory Analyses 
In addition to the pre-registered analyses, and in an effort to explore the replicability of 
other effects using adaptions of this paradigm, I examined accurate and false recognition for 
performing actions. Next, I explored metamemory with respect to the correlation between 
predicted and actual performance as well as the relative accuracy (i.e., resolution) for different 
statement types. I then examined whether participants adhered to experimenter instructions to 
keep their responses balanced. Finally, I examined any potential role for volition based on items 
that were wholly under the participant’s control to choose (prior to an experimenter instructing 
individuals to remain even across their responses), as well as based on whether individuals chose 
items according to a strategy or at random. 
Accurate vs. False Memory for Performing Actions 
Prior research (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep) has also examined memory for having 
performed an action (or memory for having studied an image; Vieira & Lane, 2013), regardless 
of people’s memory for whether and how an item was rehearsed. For accurate 
“performed/studied” responses, the general finding is that performed actions that were rehearsed 
(either by truthfully describing or lying by denying) are more correctly recognized as having 
been performed than performed actions that were not rehearsed. Similarly, for inaccurate 
“performed/studied” responses, unperformed actions that were rehearsed are sometimes more 
often falsely recognized as having been previously performed. In some studies, false recognition 
of actions is increased for repeated truthful denials (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep; Vieira & 
Lane, 2013) as well as for false descriptions (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in prep), compared to 
unperformed actions that were not rehearsed. Of particular practical importance are false 
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recognition errors, wherein repeatedly telling the truth (in the case of repeated true denials) or 
providing a false description (either once or three times) might paradoxically lead to false 
memories of never-seen items or pieces of information in an interview. 
 
Figure 14. Accurate recognition of a performed action (lie-deny, truth-describe) as having been 
performed based on rehearsal type, Experiment 2. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
In terms of accurate recognition for performing an action, a 2 (Volition: Instructed, 
Volitional) x 2 (JOL: Absent, Present) x 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on the mean proportion of correct “yes” responses to the test item “Did you perform this action?” 
(see Figure 14). There was a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 127) = 10.77, p = .001, d = 
0.29 [0.12, 0.47]. Accurate recognition of an action as having been performed was significantly 
higher for truthfully (described) actions (M = .97, SE = .01) than for actions that were lied about 
(i.e., falsely denied; M = .94, SE = .01). There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions, F’s < 2.59, p’s > .11. 
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Pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine the effect of each performed and 
rehearsed item type (performed lie-deny, performed truth-describe) on accurate recognition rates, 
relative to the control items that were performed and not rehearsed. Here, compared to actions 
that were not rehearsed during the first session (M = .88, SE = .01), accurate recognition was 
significantly higher for items that were truthfully described (t(130) = 6.55, p < .001, d = 0.57 
[0.39, 0.76]) as well as for items that were falsely denied (t(130) = 4.44, p < .001, d = 0.39 [0.21, 
0.57]). 
 
Figure 15. False recognition of an unperformed action (lie-describe, truth-deny) as having been 
performed based on rehearsal type, Experiment 2. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
Next, false recognition of unperformed actions was assessed. A 2 (Volition: Instructed, 
Volitional) x 2 (JOL: Absent, Present) x 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on mean proportion of incorrect “yes” responses to the test item “Did you perform this action?” 
(see Figure 15). There was a significant main effect of Veracity, F(1, 127) = 51.62, p < .001, d = 
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0.64 [0.45, 0.83]. False recognition of an action as having been performed was significantly 
higher for actions that had been lied about (i.e., falsely described; M = .14, SE = .01) than for 
actions that were truthfully denied (M = .04, SE = .01). There was also a significant main effect 
of JOL condition, F(1, 127) = 8.99, p = .003, d = 0.50 [0.15, 0.85]. Participants who provided 
JOLs in the first session (M = .12, SE = .01) were more likely to falsely recognize unperformed 
actions as having been performed than participants who did not provide JOLs (M = .06, SE = 
.02). There were no other significant main effects or interactions, F’s < 2.04, p’s > .16. 
Pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine the effect of each unperformed and 
rehearsed item type (i.e., unperformed truth-deny, unperformed lie-describe) on false recognition 
rates, relative to the control items that were neither performed nor rehearsed. Overall, actions 
that were not performed but falsely described were more likely to be incorrectly recognized as 
having been performed (M = .14, SE = .01) compared to actions that were not rehearsed at all (M 
= .03, SE = .01; t(130) = 7.78, p < .001, d = 0.64 [0.45, 0.83]). There was no significant 
difference in false recognition rates when actions were truthfully denied (M = .05, SE = .01) 
compared to the no rehearsal control items, t(130) = 1.31, p = .19, d = 0.12 [-0.06, 0.29]. 
Correlation between Predicted and Actual Performance 
 Pearson correlations were computed to compare the relationship between average 
predicted memory ratings and source accuracy for each item type. There was a small, 
nonsignificant positive correlation between predicted and actual memory performance for actions 
that were truthfully denied (r(67) = .19, p = .12), falsely denied (r(67) = .03, p = .78), truthfully 
described (r(67) = .09, p = .48), and falsely described (r(67) = .04, p = .75). 
Resolution 
To explore relative accuracy, a resolution measure (Goodman-Kruskal gamma 
correlation) was computed between memory prediction ratings and memory test performance for 
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each subject separately for actions that were rehearsed truthfully and deceptively, as well as for 
actions that were rehearsed by denial or description. Gamma correlations could not be computed 
for participants who did not provide a range of values for judgments of learning (n = 2) or for 
participants who were accurate on all items on the final test (n = 1).  
I first conducted a 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Volition: Instructed, Volitional) mixed 
ANOVA to compare participants’ resolution for lies and truths. There was no main effect of 
Veracity (F(1, 59) = 2.30, p = .14, d = 0.19 [-0.06, 0.45]), no main effect of Volition (F(1, 59) = 
0.02, p = .88, d = 0.08 [-0.42, 0.57]), nor an interaction between the two (F(1, 59) = 0.48, p = 
.49, ηp2 = .01). Next, I conducted a 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) x 2 (Volition: Instructed, 
Volitional) mixed ANOVA to compare participants’ resolution for denials and descriptions. 
Again, there was no main effect of Veracity (F(1, 57) = 0.09, p = .77, d = 0.04 [-0.21, 0.30]), no 
main effect of Volition (F(1, 57) = 0.91, p = .35, d = 0.08 [-0.42, 0.08]), nor an interaction 
between the two (F(1, 57) = 0.32, p = .57, ηp2 = .01. 
Item Choices 
Before beginning the Rehearsal Phase, participants who were given volition over their 
lies and truths were instructed to do their best to keep their responses as even as possible across 
item types. After half of the trials, the experiment paused the Rehearsal Phase and provided 
participants with an update of their current item distributions. In the event that the items were 
extremely imbalanced (i.e., less than 3 or more than 5 per item type), the experimenter 
encouraged participants to try to balance their responses more evenly in the next half of the 
trials. 
For the first half of the trials, participants tended to favor truthfully describing (57%) 
over falsely denying (43%) actions that had been performed during the Action Phase. For actions 
that had not been performed, participants provided true denials (50%) at the same rate as false 
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descriptions (50%). This pattern persisted in the second half of trials, such that across all 16 
performed actions participants provided more truthful descriptions (55%) than false denials 
(45%) but equal amounts of true denials (50%) and false descriptions (50%) for the 16 
unperformed actions. 
Items Before Experimenter Interruption 
There was no effect of volition on participants’ source accuracy when all of the items 
were considered. However, these items include actions that participants may have exerted less 
control in choosing, given that they were paused halfway through the first session and reminded 
to even their responses. I explored whether volition might have an effect for actions that 
participants had the most volition over: items present in the first half of the rehearsal trials, 
before the experimenter interrupted them. When only these first half items are considered, there 
was neither a main effect of Volition (F(1, 127) = 2.58, p = .11, d = 0.27 [-0.07, 0.62]) nor an 
interaction between Volition and Veracity (F(1, 127) = 0.01, p = .92, ηp2 < .01). 
Accuracy Based on Self-Reported Strategy 
After completing the Rehearsal Phase of Session 1, participants in the Volition conditions 
were asked to provide an open-ended response describing how they selected which items to lie or 
tell the truth about. These responses were coded as comprising one of six strategies: participant 
selections were either random (i.e., no strategy was used; n = 6), or participants endeavored to 
keep their responses even as per the experimenter instructions (n = 18); alternated back and forth 
between lies and truths (n = 17); based their decisions on how easy or difficult it was to describe 
(or deny) an action (n = 20); on the quality of their memory for the action (n = 11); or on how 
easy it was to imagine the action (n = 7). For analytic purposes, these strategies were collapsed 
into two overarching categories: instructional (keeping responses even, alternating) and memory-
based (ease of describing, quality of memory, ease of imagining). If participants referenced 
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multiple strategies, only the first strategy provided was used for groupings. There was no 
significant difference in strategy selection based on whether or not participants provided JOLs, 
F2 (2, 66) = 4.67, p = .10.  
I also explored whether participants’ self-reported lie strategies might affect performance. 
Participant selections in the volitional group were further coded as i) having no strategy; ii) using 
an instructional strategy; or iii) using a memory-based strategy. To assess whether these strategy 
choices affected source accuracy, a 3 (Strategy: No Strategy, Memory-Based, Instructional) x 2 
(JOL: Absent, Present) x 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of accurate source test responses. There was a 
significant main effect of Veracity (F(1, 125) = 4.01, p = .05, d = 0.12 [-0.06, 0.29]). Accuracy 
on the source test was higher for truthfully rehearsed actions (M = .51, SE = .02) than for 
deceptively rehearsed actions (M = .47, SE = .02; d = 0.12). Further, there was a significant main 
effect of Rehearsal Type (F(1, 125) = 159.63, p < .001, d = 1.29 [1.06, 1.52]). As in the earlier 
analysis, accuracy was higher for actions that were described (M = .66, SE = .02) rather than 
denied (M = .32, SE = .02; d = 1.28). These main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction between Veracity and Rehearsal Type (F(1, 125) = 81.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. For 
actions that were described, accuracy was higher for truthful descriptions (M = .76, SE = .02) 
than false descriptions (M = .55, SE = .02), t(130) = 9.50, p < .001, d = 0.71). The opposite 
pattern was found for actions that had been denied –false denials (M = .40, SE = .02) were 
associated with higher accuracy on the memory test compared to true denials (M = .23, SE = 
.02), t(130) = 6.89, p < .001, d = -0.60 [-0.79, 0.42]). As in the earlier analysis, there was no 
main effect of Strategy (F(2, 125) = 0.52, p = .59, ηp2 = .01, nor an interaction between Strategy 
and Veracity (F(2, 125) = 1.93, p = .15, ηp2 = .03). There was also no main effect of providing 
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JOLs, (F(1, 125) = 0.03, p = .86, d = 0.17 [-0.17, 0.51]. No other main effects or interactions 
were significant, F’s < 2.69, p’s > .07. 
Summary of Findings 
The primary focus of Experiment 2 was to explore the role of volition on both predictions 
of future memory performance and actual memory performance. As in Experiment 1, both 
predicted and actual memory performance only varied as a function of veracity and type of 
statement provided. People believed they would be more likely to remember their truthful 
statements, especially when they had truthfully described performing an action. Accuracy on the 
final source and recognition test was also greater for actions that were described – especially if 
those descriptions were truthful – whereas actions that were denied were better remembered if 
those denials were lies. Further, although similar patterns of predicted and actual memory 
performance were observed, there was not a statistically significant relation between JOLs and 
performance, nor any difference in this relationship based on any manipulated variables. Finally, 
people again remembered fewer features of lied-about actions than features of actions they had 
truthfully described. It appears that, relative to telling the truth, lying has negative consequences 
for memory accuracy. 
In this experiment, I conceptualized volitional deception as a choice of when to lie. 
During the rehearsal phase, participants viewed an action statement and then decided to lie or tell 
the truth on that trial. However, this manipulation failed to significantly affect memory and 
metamemory performance. Based on Bayes factors (BF01), there was weak evidence for a null 
effect of volition on JOL ratings, with volitional participants demonstrating numerically higher 
ratings of predicted memory performance relative to instructed participants. This weak effect 
suggests that volition might still be a worthy factor to consider in memory predictions, given it 
may be more likely a consequence of low power than a true null effect. In terms of accurate 
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memory performance, however, exploratory analyses showed no role for volition when only first 
half trials or strategic participants were included. Therefore, it may be the case that while 
volition may be an important qualitative characteristic of deception in everyday life, choosing 
when to lie may be inconsequential for memory performance after lying. Volition may only be 
important in the context of other ecologically valid characteristics not examined in this 
experiment, such as providing an incentive or motivation, allowing time to prepare or plan a 
statement, or allowing free choice unconstrained by an experimenter’s instruction to balance 
response types. 
Finally, I extended prior work assessing accurate and false memory for having performed 
an action. Previous studies have shown that rehearsing unperformed actions – either by truthfully 
saying “I did not perform [action]” or by creating a false description of having performed an 
action – can increase false recognition of these actions as having been performed on a final 
memory test. Here, I not only showed this pattern with respect to actions that had been lied 
about, but also found that false recognition overall was greater for participants who made JOLs 
during Session 1. I return to these effects and their implications in the General Discussion. 
Experiments 1 and 2 offered a laboratory-based, controlled methodology to examine 
memory and metamemory for lies and truths, and also to examine whether volition might be 
important to the relationship between lying and memory. In the following experiment, I 
continued to examine the relationship between lying and memory using a more ecologically-
valid investigative interviewing paradigm. The primary aim of Experiment 3 was to determine 
whether there are reliable differences in consistency for true and false narratives, and whether 
such consistency might be moderated by the type of interview approach.
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Table 4  
Experiment 2 Mean Proportion of Source Responses for Each Item Type  
  Response Options 
 “I performed this action” “I did not perform this action” 
Item Type 
“I lied by 
denying that 
I performed 
this action 
on camera” 
“I 
truthfully 
described 
this action 
on camera” 
“I did not 
talk about 
this action 
on camera” 
“I told the 
truth by 
denying that 
I performed 
this action 
on camera” 
“I lied by 
describing 
this action 
on camera” 
“I did not 
talk about 
this action 
on camera” 
Performed Lie Deny .40 (.02) .26 (.02) .27 (.02) .01 (.00) .01 (.00) .04 (.01) 
Performed Truth Describe .14 (.01) .76 (.02) .07 (.01) .00 (.00) .01 (.00) .02 (.01) 
Performed No Rehearsal .20 (.02) .18 (.02) .50 (.03) .01 (.00) .02 (.01) .09 (.01) 
Unperformed Truth Deny .01 (.00) .02 (.01) .02 (.00) .23 (.02)  .18 (.02) .55 (.02) 
Unperformed Lie Describe  .04 (.01) .06 (.01) .05 (.02) .10 (.01)  .55 (.02) .21 (.02) 
Unperformed No Rehearsal .01 (.00) .02 (.01) .01 (.00) .04 (.01) .06 (.01) .87 (.01) 
 
Note. Values for correct source responses are in boldface. Standard errors are in parentheses. Responses are collapsed across volition 
and metacognitive judgment conditions. 
  
 
74 
Table 5  
Experiment 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 JOL Ratings 
Recognition as 
“Performed” 
Total Details – 
Rehearsal 
Total Details – 
Descriptions Test 
Number of 
Consistent Details 
Item Type Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Performed Lie Deny  .67 .03 .94 .01 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Performed Truth Describe  .77 .02 .97 .01 3.18 .14 2.48 .13 1.77 .10 
Performed No Rehearsal -- -- .88 .01 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Unperformed Truth Deny  .67 .03 .04 .03 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Unperformed Lie Describe  .62 .03 .14 .01 2.90 .14 1.92 .11 1.29 .08 
Unperformed No Rehearsal -- -- .03 .01 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Note. Values for correct “performed” responses on the source test are in boldface. Responses collapsed across volition and 
metacognitive judgment conditions.  
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CHAPTER 4.    EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 3, consistency across repeated interviews was examined using a behavioral 
paradigm in which participants completed a series of complex tasks prior to being interviewed. 
Given the difficulty of establishing ground truth when asking people to recall a prior experience, 
the current paradigm allowed for a more objective assessment of information obtained from an 
interviewee’s statement as a function of recommended interviewing techniques used during an 
initial interview (a structured interview and a reverse-order recall instruction). Participants 
completed a scavenger hunt at four different locations on campus during an initial session. 
Subsequently, participants chose two of the buildings to tell the truth about their activities, and 
then created a lie about activities in two other buildings that had not been visited. Participants 
were interviewed on one or two occasions, depending on their assigned condition. Interviews 
occurred immediately following the event (for some participants) and following a 7-day delay 
(for all participants). Some participants were randomly assigned to be initially interviewed using 
one of two forensic interview protocols, or to not complete an initial interview. Seven days later, 
all participants returned for a second session, during which participants were interviewed about 
their activities the week prior. Participants were provided an open-ended prompt to freely recall 
each of the two events that they experienced in the first session, describing each event truthfully 
or deceptively. For participants for whom this was their second interview, they were instructed to 
continue lying or telling the truth as they had done in the first session. Lastly, participants 
provided a final truthful description of the lied-about event as well as a final account of the 
truthfully rehearsed event. Experiment 3 therefore examined how lying on a prior interview 
affects one’s memory for what truthfully occurred, and how interviewing techniques might affect 
the consistency of information reported across repeated interviews. 
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Hypotheses 
H4: Participants will recall fewer correct details about a lied-about event, compared to 
the events that were rehearsed truthfully. 
Providing an initially deceptive, elaborated description might lead to inaccurate memory. 
For instance, Pickel (2004) showed that eyewitnesses who provide false descriptions or false 
details of a perpetrator were more likely to provide that self-generated false information on a 
later test, decreasing overall accuracy. This suggests that false descriptions, once generated, have 
the potential to powerfully influence a liar’s memory.  
H5a: Participants interviewed with a Reverse Order technique will show more omitted 
details than participants interviewed with a Structured Interview. 
Interviewing techniques such as Reverse Order instructions tend to increase the amount 
of information provided in an event narrative. Therefore, I hypothesize that in the absence of 
retrieval cues on a subsequent recall attempt (as when only a free report is requested of an 
interviewee) participants will report fewer details overall on a subsequent interview. Following 
only a 3-minute delay between repeated interviews, Hudson et al. (2017) observed more 
omissions following a reverse-order recall instruction. However, the reverse-order instruction 
was administered by Hudson and colleagues after an initial open narrative – akin to the Phase I 
interview in the current dissertation. In contrast, the order of interview prompts in the current 
dissertation will be reversed such that participants will first provide a statement following a 
reverse-order instruction (during Phase I) and then omissions will be assessed when compared 
with the subsequent free recall instruction (during Phase II). 
H5b: Participants will be more consistent when truthfully describing an event than when 
deceptively describing an event.  
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H5c: Participants will provide more new details when truthfully describing an event than 
when deceptively describing an event. 
When faced with diverse retrieval cues (such as when asked to describe an event in 
reverse-chronological order), truth-tellers are able to rely on their memory for an event to 
provide an elaborated statement. When comparing consistency as the proportion of consistent 
details relative to contradictions, truth-tellers are more consistent than liars (Leins et al., 2012). 
However, because truth-tellers are able to draw from a truly experienced event, they might also 
be more likely to possess additional information to provide on a subsequent recall opportunity 
(Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). 
H6a: Participants interviewed with a Reverse Order instruction will provide more 
detailed narratives overall, compared to participants interviewed with a Structured Interview. 
Varied retrieval can enhance the amount of information reported from memory and is an 
important component of one of the most widely studied evidence-based interviewing techniques, 
the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Thus, I expect to see longer initial 
statements from a Reverse Order interview instruction, compared to when these instructions are 
not administered prior to an interview. 
H6b: Participants will provide more detailed statements when describing an event 
truthfully, compared to when describing an event deceptively. 
Truth-tellers are able to draw on their memory for an episodic event to add details to their 
statements, whereas liars are likely to invent stories that lack the richness of such details. This 
assumption underlies a popular method of assessing credibility with verbal content: Criteria-
Based Content Analysis (Steller, 1989; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). Evidence suggests that this 
may be particularly true when comparing liar and truth-teller statements following a Reverse 
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Order instruction (Evans et al., 2013). Thus, an interaction between Interview Technique and 
Veracity has some support in prior research, but only main effects are specifically predicted 
given the inconsistency in findings. 
H7: Participants who provided an initial statement during Interview Phase I will provide 
more detailed statements on a subsequent interview, compared to participants in the Initial 
Interview-Absent condition. 
Given the known benefits of retrieval for later memory performance (e.g., Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006), I hypothesize that on a later free report, participants who provided an account 
of their activities on an initial interview will provide more information than those not initially 
tested. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 112 participants (56 female) were recruited from Iowa State University, and 
105 completed the full experiment (n = 7 dropped out between Session 1 and Session 2). Data 
from six additional participants were excluded for not complying with interview instructions for 
either Phase I or Phase II interviews. Thus, the final sample analyzed for the dissertation had 
slightly uneven cells for Interview Absent (n = 29), Reverse Order (n = 32), and Structured 
Interview (n = 38) conditions. The ages of participants varied between 18 and 28 years of age (M 
= 19.38, SD = 1.39). 
Due to University closure in the Spring of 2020 in response to the COVID-19 virus, data 
collection ended prematurely. The target sample of 144 research participants (n = 48 per group) 
would provide sufficient power to detect a relatively small within-between interaction effect size 
(f = .15) with power of .90 (Faul et al., 2009). This power analysis is based on prior work 
demonstrating differences in consistency for liars and truth-tellers across repeated interviews 
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(e.g., f = .31 in Leins et al., 2012) and robust increases in total detail following strategic 
interviewing techniques (e.g., f = .20 when comparing chronological recall and reverse order 
recall in Hudson et al., 2019). To appropriately power an interaction between Veracity and 
Interview Technique, a more conservative effect size was used (f = .15) than has been observed 
in prior work. Data analyzed and presented here represent those collected prior to the university 
closure in March of 2020. The remaining participants needed to fulfill the proposed target 
sample will be collected when the University reopens and initiates human subject research. Had 
the power analysis been less conservative (e.g., to power .80), the current sample size would 
have been sufficient to detect the anticipated effect size. 
Design 
A 3 (Initial Interview Technique: Absent, Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) x 2 
(Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Interview Time: Phase I, Phase II) mixed design was used. Initial 
Interview Technique was manipulated between-participants, and Veracity and Interview Time 
were manipulated within-participants. 
Procedure 
 
Figure 16. Depiction of procedure used in Experiment 3 
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Participants completed two sessions conducted one week apart (see Figure 16). The first 
session comprised the Encoding Phase and the Phase I Interview (for initially-interviewed 
conditions). Participants visited four buildings (two pairs of buildings total) on the Iowa State 
University campus and completed a scavenger hunt for information within each building. After 
completing the scavenger hunt, some participants were interviewed about their activities 
(Reverse Order, Structured Interview conditions) and some were dismissed from the session 
(Absent condition). Before being interviewed, participants were instructed that they would 
truthfully tell the interviewer about one pair of buildings of their choice; they would not discuss 
the other pair of buildings they visited, and instead were instructed to lie about a specific set of 
buildings that were not visited during the experiment. 
Encoding Phase 
Upon arrival to the session, participants received instructions and provided informed 
consent to complete the experiment. Before beginning the Encoding Phase, participants 
completed a brief survey assessing their familiarity with six buildings on the University campus 
on scale from 1 (I have never been there/Not familiar) to 7 (I know the ins and outs of the 
building/Extremely familiar).  
During the Encoding Phase, participants completed what they believed to be a study 
assessing people’s memory for previously performed activities. Participants received instructions 
that they would be going to different buildings on the university campus and performing a 
scavenger hunt at each one. Participants then navigated to two “areas” of campus (i.e., two 
buildings near each other: Pair A: Science Hall & Lagomarcino Hall; Pair B: Parks Library & 
Beardshear Hall; Pair C: LeBaron Hall & Mackay Hall) and completed a series of brief tasks at 
each one. Throughout the course of the Encoding Phase, participants were tasked to remember 
six key pieces of information that they learned in each area. Three versions of the scavenger hunt 
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were created, such that each pair of buildings was equally presented to participants as the first 
area or second area to which they navigated. All version tasks and instructions for the scavenger 
hunt can be found on the OSF repository. 
Science Hall I and Lagomarcino Hall 
Participants went to the first, second, and third floors of Science Hall I. Pieces of 
information included the states present in a topographical map at the top of a set of stairs, 
information about properties of minerals, and the type of geological specimen present in a 
display case. Next, participants headed to the Lagomarcino Hall courtyard and café, and were 
tasked to remember details such as the daily hot special, a made-to-order sandwich order slip, 
and the title of a book carved into the façade of a fountain.  
Parks Library and Beardshear Hall 
In Parks Library, participants sought objects on the first and third floors. For instance, 
participants had to find murals throughout the building and remember details about what was 
present in each scene, and retrieve a book with a specific call number from the shelving stacks 
and remember the theme of a certain page. From Parks Library, participants navigated to 
Beardshear Hall. In this administration building, participants located a plaque honoring 
Distinguished Professors (and were tasked to remember the Colleges associated with awardees) 
as well as a bulletin board of campus event advertisements (and picked an upcoming event that 
they planned on attending). 
LeBaron Hall and Mackay Hall 
Participants were first tasked to count the number of bikes outside of LeBaron Hall. 
Within the building, participants found information about majors offered by the College of 
Human Sciences as well as a plaque for recipients of the Honorary Alumni Award. From 
LeBaron Hall, participants headed to Mackay Hall and located a memorial fountain 
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(remembering the date that it was installed), an outreach bulletin board (taking a recipe card and 
imagining preparing the dish), and a career development display case (remembering the types of 
industries available in a particular state). 
When participants arrived back to the lab, those in the Interview-Absent condition were 
dismissed and asked to return one week later to complete Session 2. Those in the Interview-
Present conditions (Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) received instructions for the initial 
interview phase. Participants will be instructed that they will be interviewed about their actions 
after leaving the lab. For the interview, they will be asked to tell the truth about one area of 
campus (meaning one “pair” of buildings) and lie about another area of campus. The participants 
could choose either the first pair of buildings that they visited or the second pair of buildings that 
they visited about which to tell the truth but were instructed that they must lie about a pre-
specified set of buildings. For instance, if participants in reality had visited Science Hall I and 
Lagomarcino Hall (Pair A) as well as Parks Library and Beardshear Hall (Pair B), their 
statements would involve a truthful account of either Pair A or Pair B and a false account about 
having visited LeBaron Hall and Mackay Hall (Pair C). 
For the lied-about event, participants were instructed that they needed to create a detailed, 
believable cover story. Participants were provided with a worksheet with minimal information 
about the buildings they were tasked with lying about (that was gleaned from the public access 
building information available on the University’s Facilities Planning and Management website; 
see OSF for the worksheet) and given 5-6 minutes to write down details that could be provided 
in their narratives. To motivate participants to lie well during the task, participants were told that 
their interviews will be evaluated by other people after the session has concluded, and the person 
who is judged to be most believable will win a $25 reward. After the cover story prep time was 
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complete, the experimenter confirmed that the participant understood the instructions for the 
interview task and then left the room to notify the interviewer. 
Phase I Interview 
The participants interviewed in Phase I were randomly assigned to be interviewed with a 
Reverse Order Instruction or a Structured Interview (the scripts for each interview condition can 
be found on OSF). The interviewers always began by asking for an initial open-ended narrative 
for their activities at the first area of campus, and then an open-ended narrative for the second 
area of campus.  
In the Reverse Order condition, the interviewer followed up the initial request by asking 
the participant interviewee to recall their activities in the two areas again in reverse chronological 
order, beginning from the last temporal detail that they provide for each area. In the Structured 
Interview condition, the interviewer followed up the initial request by asking for more specific 
information about the participant’s statement. For each area of campus, the interviewer asked 
three probing questions about details the participant had mentioned in their initial open narrative.  
After the conclusion of the interview, participants completed a brief post-interview 
questionnaire. In addition to demographic information, participants reflected on how well they 
remembered the tasks that they had completed, what strategy they used to select which event to 
describe deceptively, how motivated they were to be perceived as truthful, if they did anything in 
particular to convince the interviewer that they were telling the truth, how comfortable they are 
with lying in everyday life, as well as global perceptions of the interviewer. 
Phase II Interview 
One week later, all participants (Interview-Absent, Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) 
returned to the lab for Session 2 to complete the Phase II interview. At the beginning of the 
session, the experimenter informed all participants that they will be interviewed (for the first 
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time, for Interview-Absent participants; or again, for Reverse-Order and Structured Interview 
participants) about their activities during the first session of the experiment. Participants will be 
asked to provide a free recall narrative of the two areas of campus that they visited the week 
prior. At this time, Interview-Absent conditions were given the same lie-truth instructions and 
cover story prep time as participants who were interviewed in Session 1. All other participants 
(Reverse-Order and Structured Interview participants) were instructed to continue to respond 
truthfully or deceptively for each area of campus as they did in Session 1. During the Phase II 
interview, the interviewer again requested an open-ended narrative from participants recalling as 
much information as possible about their activities in both areas of campus.  
Final All-Truth Interview 
After describing the two areas of campus truthfully and deceptively, the interviewer 
informed the participants that they knew the participants were told to lie about their activities in 
the previous session. Therefore, the participant’s last experimental task was to describe both 
events as they actually occurred. In addition to providing a third and final statement about their 
truthfully rehearsed event, participants were told to cease responding deceptively (about their 
chosen, lied-about event) and to describe their activities truthfully and in as much detail as 
possible. 
At the conclusion of the Phase II interview, participants completed a similar post-
experiment questionnaire as in the earlier session. These questions reflected overall task 
memory, strategy use, motivation, comfort with lying in everyday life, and perceptions of the 
interviewer and the interview experience. Further, they were asked to what extent did they expect 
to be interviewed again, as well as to what extend did they expect the second half of the 
interview (when they were asked to provide a truthful account of both areas they visited in 
session 1), and how difficult was it to truthfully recall their activities during the first session. For 
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participants who did receive an initial interview (either Reverse Order or Structured Interview 
conditions), they were asked to what extent did they try to repeat everything they had already 
said about their activities during Session 1 (i.e., to be consistent) and to what extent did they try 
to provide new information about the first and second areas they visited during the Encoding 
Phase. For the Interview-Absent participants, this questionnaire also contained the same 
questions as the post-Phase I interview questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a cued-
recall test for the details that they were tasked to remember during Session 1. Before being 
debriefed, participants were asked whether they rehearsed their story or discussed the experiment 
with anyone since completing Session 1.  
Coding of Interview Statements 
Video recorded interviews for each Phase (Phase I, Phase II) were coded for subsequent 
analysis. For Phase I interviews, research assistants coded details that were present during the 
initial chronological narrative that were also repeated post-tactic as well as details that were 
added to participant statements after the tactic or instruction was implemented. A Total Phase I 
unique details measure was computed by summing: i) consistent pre- and post-tactic details, and 
ii) new details post-tactic.  
For participants who were not interviewed during Phase I, the same coding scheme was 
applied for their Phase II interviews. For all other participants, Phase II interviews were coded 
for details that were: i) repeated between Phase I and Phase II (consistent details); ii) 
contradictory to details provided during Phase I (inconsistent-contradiction details); iii) added 
during Phase II that were not said during Phase I (inconsistent-reminiscent details); and iv) failed 
to be provided during Phase II that were said at Phase I (inconsistent-omitted details).  
There is some variability in the kinds of inconsistency that have been examined 
empirically. For instance, some researchers have focused on inconsistency in terms of 
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reminiscent items (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006), while others focused on consistency relative to 
contradictions provided (Leins et al., 2012), or simply the sum total of each type of (in)consistent 
detail (Hudson et al., 2019). For the current dissertation, I assessed the amount of consistent 
details provided, rather than proportion of consistent details relative to other information 
provided. Additionally, I also assessed two specific types of inconsistency, including the amount 
of information that participants omitted on the Phase II interview (omitted details), and the 
amount of information that participants added during the Phase II interview (new details).  
During the final interview, participants were told to provide a final truthful statement for 
both areas of campus that they actually visited during the encoding phase of Session 1. These all 
truthful statements were then coded for the amount of detail provided for both areas of campus – 
one that they had rehearsed truthfully in the earlier Phase I and Phase II interviews, and one that 
they had lied about by describing their activities in an alternate area of campus. In addition to the 
quantity of details provided during this final, all-truth interview, I coded the content of 
participants statements in terms of accuracy for the specific key details (six per “area” of 
campus) could be assessed, given the highly variable nature of the remainder of the encoding 
experience. 
Results 
All materials and data necessary to produce the statistical results present in the Results 
are hosted on OSF (https://osf.io/atz5h/?view_only=9145768db8994851a122bcdd495f5003). 
The following results are separated by whether they were hypothesized (and pre-registered) or 
exploratory. Below, I begin by assessing the effects of the veracity of a statement and the 
presence and type of interview tactic used to elicit an initial narrative on participants’ ability to 
correctly recall information learned during the scavenger hunt. I then assess the effect of the 
veracity of a statement and the type of interview technique used on proportions of consistent and 
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inconsistent details provided between two statements. Next, I examine differences in the amount 
of unique detail provided during initial and subsequent interviews based on the veracity of the 
statement and the presence and type of interview technique used to elicit an initial narrative.  
Hypothesized Analyses 
All predictions in the committee-approved dissertation were pre-registered on OSF before 
being analyzed. When null results are found for the pre-registered hypotheses, I provide Bayes 
Factors (BF01) to discuss the strength of the observed evidence for a null effect. 
Correct Recall on Final Interview 
During the last portion of the Phase II interviews, participants were asked to provide a 
final truthful account of their activities in both areas of campus that they visited during the 
Encoding Phase in the first experimental session. This interview offered the opportunity to assess 
the influence of having previously recalled an event truthfully vs. deceptively. Accuracy is 
considered here in two ways. First, with respect to the accuracy of the six key details that 
participants were tasked to remember while completing the scavenger hunt in the Encoding 
Phase that were present in participant’s narratives. Second, with respect to accuracy for the six 
key details on the cued-recall test at the end of the experiment. The present analysis is a coarse-
grained assessment of accurate memory for the to-be-remembered key details. If participants 
mentioned a detail they were tasked to remember during their narrative during the interview, the 
detail was coded as a ‘1’ if it was present and accurate in the statement (e.g., correctly recalling 
“1926” as the year a fountain was installed in Mackay Hall). The same was true if participants 
correctly answered the cued recall question on the final test. A score of ‘0’ for a detail was given 
for inaccurate details (e.g., an incorrect year), non-specific details (e.g., saying they were told to 
remember a year, but not providing the year), or when the participant said they could not 
remember the item. If a detail was not mentioned at all, it was omitted from consideration in 
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creating accuracy proportions. Accurate details per area thus ranged from 0 to 6 details, and from 
these I created a proportion of accurate details based on the number of details that were 
mentioned (note: the pattern of results does not change when the proportion of all potential key 
details are included, rather than just those details mentioned correctly or incorrectly). I expected 
that participants would recall more accurate details about the events that they had truthfully 
rehearsed in prior interviews, compared to the events that participants lied about visiting (H4). 
 
Figure 17. Proportion of key details correctly recalled during the final all-truth interview, 
Experiment 3. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
A 3 (Initial Interview Technique: Absent, Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) x 2 
(Veracity: Lie, Truth) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of accurate details mentioned in 
participants’ all-truth interview statements (see Figure 17). Supporting hypothesis H4, there was 
a significant main effect of Veracity, such that memory for the key details was more accurate for 
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areas of campus that had been previously truthfully recalled (M = .46, SE = .03) than areas of 
campus that were lied about (M = .33, SE = .03), F(1, 96) = 15.44, p < .001, d = 0.41 [0.21, 
0.62]. Neither the main effect of Interview Technique (F(2, 96) = 1.13, p = .33, ηp2 = .02) nor the 
interaction between Initial Interview Technique and Veracity (F(2, 96) = 1.37, p = .26, ηp2 = .03) 
were significant. 
 
Figure 18. Proportion of key details correctly answered on the final cued-recall test, Experiment 
3. Errors bars represent standard errors 
A 3 (Initial Interview Technique: Absent, Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) x 2 
(Veracity: Lie, Truth) ANOVA was also conducted on the proportion of details that were 
correctly answered on the cued-recall test (see Figure 18). Again, there was a significant main 
 90 
effect of Veracity, such that memory for the key details was more accurate for areas of campus 
that had been previously truthfully recalled (M = .69, SE = .02) than areas of campus that were 
lied about (M = .58, SE = .03), F(1, 96) = 11.51, p = .001, ηp2 = .11, d = 0.36 [0.15, 0.56]. 
Neither the main effect of Initial Interview Technique (F(2, 96) = 1.31, p = .28, ηp2 = .03) nor the 
interaction between Initial Interview Technique and Veracity (F(2, 96) = 0.80, p = .45, ηp2 = .02) 
were significant. 
Between-Statement Consistency 
Statements from participants who were interviewed in Phase I and Phase II were coded 
by two research assistants for the volume of information provided (discussed in a later section) 
and the consistency of details that were provided. Inter-rater reliability was high (r’s > .93 for 
each described area), therefore only one coder’s ratings were used for the present analyses. I 
assessed the correspondence between features present in participant statements from Interview 
Phases I and II with respect to consistent details, omitted details, and new details. I expected to 
see a main effect of Initial Interview Technique for omitted details (H5a), such that participants 
interviewed with a Reverse Order instruction would provide fewer details that were said in Phase 
I compared to the Structured Interview. I also expected a main effect of Veracity for the number 
of consistent items (H5b) and new items (H5c), such that truthfully described events should be 
associated with a higher rate of consistent details and additional information that had not been 
previously provided. 
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Figure 19. Proportion of details that were consistent or inconsistent between Phase I and Phase 
II interviews in Experiment 3. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
A 2 (Initial Interview Technique: Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) x 2 (Veracity: 
Lie, Truth) mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the number of details consistently provided 
between Phase I and Phase II, with the total amount of detail provided in Phase I as a covariate 
(see Figure 19, solid bars). Phase I total detail was related to the number of consistent details 
provided, F(1, 67) = 174.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .72). After accounting for the total number of details 
provided during Phase I, there was a significant main effect of Interview Technique, F(1, 67) = 
24.54, p < .001, d = 1.28 [0.76, 1.80]. People provided more consistent details between Phase I 
and Phase II when interviewed initially with a Reverse Order instruction (M = 21.92, SE = .95) 
than when interviewed with a Structured Interview (M = 15.16, SE = .86). However, there was 
no main effect of Veracity (F(1, 67) = 2.45, p = .12, d = 0.45 [0.11, 0.78]) nor an interaction 
between Veracity and Interview Technique (F(1, 67) < 0.01, p = .98, ηp2 < .01). 
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With respect to inconsistency, I examined differences in omissions and new details 
separately with 2 (Initial Interview Technique: Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) x 2 
(Veracity: Lie, Truth) mixed ANCOVAs on the number of omitted details (see Figure 19, shaded 
bars) and the number of new details added in Phase II (see Figure 19, open bars). Phase I total 
detail was significantly related to the number of omitted details (F(1, 67) = 168.83, p < .001, ηp2 
= .72) and the number of new details (F(1, 67) = 43.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .39). After accounting for 
the total number of details provided during Phase I, there was a main effect of Interview 
Technique on the number of details omitted from Phase II statements, F(1, 67) = 24.54, p < .01, 
d = 1.28 [0.77, 1.80]. Participants omitted more details from Phase II statements after being 
interviewed with a Structured Interview in Phase I (M = 16.25, SE = .86) relative to those 
interviewed with a Reverse Order instruction in Phase I (M = 9.49, SE = .95). Further, there was 
a significant effect of Veracity (F(1, 67) = 4.314, p = .04, d = 0.03 [-0.36, 0.30]). People omitted 
more details between Phase I and Phase II for truthfully rehearsed areas of campus (M = 12.96, 
SE = .78) than for lied-about areas of campus (M = 12.78, SE = .71). The interaction between 
Veracity and Interview Technique was not significant, F(1, 67) = 2.07, p = .15, ηp2 = .03. With 
respect to new details provided during Phase II, there was no main effect of Technique (F(1, 67) 
= 0.14, p = .71, d = 0.10 [-0.37, 0.57]) or Veracity (F(1, 67) = 2.20, p = .14, d = 0.15 [-0.18, 
0.48]), nor an interaction between the two (F(1, 67) = 1.74, p = .19, ηp2 = .03. 
Phase I and Phase II Interviews 
Statements from participants who were interviewed in Phase I and Phase II were coded 
by two research assistants for the volume of information provided. For participants’ Phase I 
interviews, unique details were coded for pre- and post-tactic for each area of campus. For Phase 
II interviews, total details included those that were consistent with their Phase I details, as well as 
new details that were not provided in Phase I (see above analysis of these details). The full 
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descriptive statistics per condition can be found in Table 6. I expected to see a main effect of 
Initial Interview Technique (H6a) and a main effect of Veracity (H6b) on total details provided 
during Phase I and Phase II interviews. Specifically, I hypothesized a greater amount of detail 
would be present in: i) statements provided by participants interviewed with a reverse-order 
recall instruction, and ii) when participants truthfully described their activities.  
 
Figure 20. Total details provided during Phase I and Phase II interviews in Experiment 3. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
A 2 (Initial Interview Technique: Structured Interview, Reverse-Order) x 2 (Veracity: 
Lie, Truth)  x 2 (Interview Time: Phase I, Phase II) ANOVA was conducted on the total amount 
of unique details present in participant’s statements (see Figure 20). There was a significant main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 68) = 9.28, p = .003, d = 0.37 [0.13, 0.61]; Interview Time, F(1, 68) = 
67.53, p < .001, d = 0.83 [0.55, 1.10]; and Interview Technique, F(1, 68) = 11.62, p = .001, d = 
0.82 [0.33, 1.31]. In support of hypothesis H6b, people provided more details when truthfully 
describing their activities (M = 28.10, SE = 1.62) than when creating false descriptions of their 
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activities (M = 25.26, SE = 1.69). Further, participants provided more detailed statements during 
Phase I (M = 30.67, SE = 1.90) compared to Phase II (M = 22.69, SE = 1.37). In contrast to 
hypothesis H6a, however, participants provided more detailed statements when they were 
interviewed with a Structured Interview script (M = 32.08, SE = 2.14) rather than a Reverse 
Order instruction (M = 21.28, SE = 2.33). Importantly, the main effects of Interview Time and 
Initial Interview Technique were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 68) = 44.09, p < 
.001, ηp2 = 0.39. While there was a significant decrease in the amount of information recalled 
from Phase I to Phase II for both conditions, this difference was much greater in the Structured 
Interview condition (t(37) = 8.24, p < .001, d = 1.34 [0.89, 1.77]) than in the Reverse Order 
condition (t(31) = 3.95, p < .001, d = 0.70 [0.31, 1.08]). No other main effects or interactions 
were significant, F’s < 0.25, p’s > .62. 
With respect to Phase II interviews, I expected that participants who were interviewed 
during Phase I would provide more detailed statements during Phase II, compared to participants 
who were not initially interviewed (H7). A 3 (Initial Interview Technique: Absent, Reverse-
Order, Structured Interview) x 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) ANOVA was conducted on the total 
amount of unique details present in participant’s statements for the Phase II interview only. Only 
a main effect of Veracity was observed (F(1, 96) = 20.28, p < .001, d = 0.45 [0.24, 0.66]. In 
Phase II interviews, participants were more detailed when describing events truthfully (M = 
24.59, SE = 1.21) than deceptively (M = 21.10, SE = 1.13). In contrast to hypothesis H7, there 
was no main effect of Interview Technique (F(2, 96) = 1.39, p = .25, ηp2 = .03, BF01 = 8.09). 
Participants provided statements of similar levels of detail during Phase II when they were 
interviewed during Phase I with a Reverse Order instruction (M = 20.52, SE = 1.93), when they 
interviewed during Phase I with a Structured Interview (M = 24.87, SE = 1.77), and when they 
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were not interviewed during Phase I (M = 23.16, SE = 2.03). The interaction between Veracity 
and Initial Interview Technique was not significant (F(2, 96) = 0.29, p = .75, ηp2 = .01).  
Exploratory Analyses 
As an exploratory measure, I assessed the strategies by which participants chose an area 
to lie or tell the truth about as well as pre-task familiarity with the six campus buildings. Next, I 
explored whether Interview-Absent participants’ initial recall was similarly detailed to 
participants who did receive an interview in Phase I. Finally, I explored whether differences in 
consistency might appear when conceptualized as a proportion of repeated items relative to the 
total amount of Phase I details (similar to how it was calculated in Experiments 1 and 2 in this 
dissertation). 
Interview Strategies 
Similar to the procedure in Experiment 2, participants were asked to provide an open-
ended response describing how they selected which area to tell the truth about in the post-
interview questionnaire. These responses were coded as comprising one of seven strategies in 
which participants decided which area to tell the truth about at random (n = 37), or because they 
remembered one area better than another (n = 19); remembered one area worse than another (n = 
9); perceived one area to be easier to lie about (n = 4); thought it made more sense logically or 
based on proximity (n = 13); the types of details available at the locations (n = 6); or because of 
their prior familiarity and knowledge of the building (n = 11). 
Prior to beginning the scavenger hunt, participants rated how familiar they with the six 
campus buildings relevant to the experiment (four that they would visit during the upcoming 
scavenger hunt, and two that they would generate a plausible false narrative about during the 
Phase I/II interview) on a scale from 1 (not familiar) to 7 (extremely familiar). A 3 (Initial 
Interview Technique: Absent, Reverse Order, Structured Interview) x 6 (Campus Building: 
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Science Hall, Lagomarcino Hall, Parks Library, Beardshear Hall, LeBaron Hall, Mackay Hall) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted to assess whether there were differences in pre-task familiarity 
with the buildings for participants randomly assigned to different interview technique conditions. 
Participants were similarly familiar with the buildings regardless of the condition to which they 
were assigned, F(2, 96) = 0.43, p = .65, ηp2 = .01. 
One plausible strategy for choosing an area of campus to truthfully describe is that people 
may have been more familiar with the buildings prior to engaging in the scavenger hunt. As a 
result, pre-task familiarity for the two buildings associated with each area of campus were 
included as predictors in a logistic regression for whether that area was selected to be truthfully 
rehearsed. A participant’s choice to tell the truth about the area of campus comprising Science 
Hall and Lagomarcino Hall was predicted by pre-task familiarity with Science Hall (M = 2.98, 
SE = .14; B = .47, Wald = 4.27, p = .04), but not pre-task familiarity with Lagomarcino Hall (M 
= 3.42, SE = .15; B = -.33, Wald = 2.53, p = .11). Familiarity with Parks Library (M = 4.80, SE = 
.14; B = -.14, Wald = .50, p = .48) and familiarity with Beardshear Hall (M = 3.29, SE = .15; B = 
.07, Wald = .19, p = .66) did not predict choosing to tell the truth about Parks Library and 
Beardshear Hall. Finally, pre-task familiarity with LeBaron Hall (M = 3.11, SE = .16; B = .01, 
Wald < .01, p = .98) or Mackay Hall (M = 2.54, SE = .16; B = .08, Wald = .21, p = .65) did not 
predict participant choosing to tell the truth about LeBaron and Mackay Halls. 
Initial Recall 
As an exploratory analysis, I examined whether there were differences in the amount of 
detail provided for the first time an area of campus was discussed, depending on whether it was 
truthfully rehearsed initially or after it had been lied about previously. For participants who 
received an initial interview, I examined whether the total amount of detail differed for their 
initial truthful statement (during the Phase I interview) relative to their truthful statement about 
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the unrehearsed area of campus that they visited (during the Final All-Truth interview). For 
participants who were not interviewed during Phase I, I compared the amount of detail in their 
initial truthful statement (during the Phase II interview) to their truthful statement about the area 
of campus they visited that they did not rehearse previously (during the Final All-Truth 
interview). 
Pairwise analyses were conducted to compare the amount of detail provided for the initial 
narrative about the previously deceptively rehearsed event relative to the initial narrative about 
the previous truthfully rehearsed event for participants in each interview condition. Participants 
provided significantly more detailed statements when initially recalling their truthful event 
compared to when they truthfully recalled the event that they previously lied about in the 
Interview Absent condition (t(26) = 6.80, p < .001, d = 1.31 [0.78, 1.82]), the Reverse Order 
condition (t(31) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.78 [0.38, 1.17]), and the Structured Interview condition 
(t(36) = 9.55, p < .001, d = 1.57 [1.08, 2.05]). 
Alternative Consistency Metric 
The primary analysis of consistency used the number of consistent items provided, with 
the total amount of detail in Phase I as a covariate. I also explored whether the computation of 
consistency matters. I assessed whether there were differences when consistency is 
conceptualized as a proportion of repeated items relative to repeated and contradictory items, as 
used by Leins et al. (2012).  
A 2 (Initial Interview Technique: Reverse-Order, Structured Interview) x 2 (Veracity: 
Lie, Truth) mixed ANCOVA was conducted on consistency proportions, with the total amount of 
detail provided in Phase I as a covariate. Phase I total detail was not significantly related to the 
proportion of consistent details (F(1, 67) = 0.13, p = .72, ηp2 < .01). There was a significant main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 67) = 4.74, p = .03, d = 0.36 [0.13, 0.60]. In support of H5b, participants 
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provided a higher proportion of consistent details when they were truthfully describing their 
activities (M = .99, SE = .003) compared to when they were lying (M = .96, SE = .01). No other 
effects were significant, F’s < 0.43, p’s > .51. 
Summary of Findings 
Several key findings emerged from Experiment 3. First, experiences that participants had 
truthfully rehearsed were associated with more accurate memory of to-be-remembered details 
when compared with those that were initially lied about, and truthfully described experiences 
were associated with more detailed narratives than lied-about experiences. Regardless of whether 
and how they were interviewed during the initial session, participants provided more 
spontaneous accurate details in the Final All-Truth interview for the area that they had previously 
truthfully rehearsed compared to the area they had previously lied about. The same was true of 
accuracy for key details on the cued-recall test at the end of the experiment. Participants also 
provided more elaborated statements when truthfully describing their activities. Thus, in line 
with the general findings of the first two experiments, it appears that choosing to lie is 
detrimental to later memory for what truthfully occurred. 
Experiment 3 differed from the prior work in that every participant in Experiment 3 
exerted volition over their lies and truths. Prior to being interviewed, all participants were tasked 
with choosing one area to tell the truth about and were then given an area of campus to create a 
lie about. Though prior knowledge and familiarity with the buildings (assessed before beginning 
the scavenger hunt) did not affect participants’ choices of which area to tell the truth about, after 
completing the scavenger hunt some people chose to tell the truth about the area from which they 
remembered more key details. Thus, because memory for the event contributed to a person’s 
choice to tell the truth, differences in memory accuracy for the key details may not necessarily be 
due to solely lying or truth-telling. 
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Asking participants to recall their activities in reverse chronological order improved 
between-statement consistency. Specifically, people in the Reverse Order condition repeated 
more consistent details and omitted fewer details between Phase I and Phase II interviews, 
compared to people who were asked follow-up probing questions in the Structured Interview 
condition. I also hypothesized that participants interviewed with a Reverse Order technique 
would provide more detailed initial narratives. In actuality, however, participants provided more 
details during Phase I when they were interviewed with additional “tell me more” questions in 
the Structured Interview, and they subsequently omitted many of these details in the Phase II 
interview. One possibility is that the interviewers in the current experiment may have probed less 
important details in the initial interview, leading participants to omit these details during a 
subsequent interview. 
In contrast to expectations, participants were similarly detailed during their Phase II 
interviews regardless of whether they had been previously interviewed. This may be due to 
participants in the Initial Interview-Absent conditions receiving their cover story information and 
preparation time immediately preceding their interviews during Phase II. However, this 
preparation time was needed to equate the instructions with those received by initially 
interviewed participants. 
The current findings add further evidence that the act of lying has downstream 
consequences for accurate recall of truthfully experienced events. That is, activities that 
participants lied about suffered in terms of both accuracy and quantity of information. 
Additionally, regardless of veracity, the type of interview approach used may have unintended 
consequences for credibility assessment. That is, people appear to be more inconsistent when a 
Structured Interview is used to elicit an initial statement for both true and false narratives. 
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Table 6  
Experiment 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Initial Interview 
Absent 
Reverse-Order  Structured 
Interview 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Phase II – Final Recall Accuracy       
Lie .33 .06 .39 .06 .26 .04 
Truth .40 .06 .51 .06 .46 .05 
Phase II – Cued Recall Accuracy       
Lie .58 .04 .65 .05 .54 .04 
Truth .66 .05 .71 .04 .69 .03 
Phase II - Consistency       
Lie -- -- 20.57 1.11 13.83 1.00 
Truth -- -- 23.27 1.18 16.48 1.07 
Phase II - Omissions       
Lie -- -- 10.30 1.24 15.62 1.12 
Truth -- -- 8.68 1.12 16.88 1.02 
Phase II - Reminiscence       
Lie -- -- 3.92 0.65 4.86 0.59 
Truth -- -- 5.06 0.54 4.64 0.49 
Phase I – Total Detail       
Lie -- -- 20.88 2.05 37.87 3.47 
Truth -- -- 23.22* 2.13 40.71* 2.91 
Phase II - Total Detail       
Lie 21.00 1.80 18.88 1.96 23.42 1.99 
Truth 25.31* 2.07 22.16 2.23 26.32 1.93 
Final All-Truth – Total Detail       
Lie 13.96* 0.90 14.84* 1.02 14.92* .94 
Truth 14.37 1.06 15.38 0.93 14.17 .93 
Note: Asterisks represent conditions compared for initial recall exploratory analysis 
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CHAPTER 5.    GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Suspects are often repeatedly interviewed during an investigation. As a result, the 
consistency of a suspect’s statements has the potential to serve as an important indicator of 
credibility. However, guilty and innocent suspects may approach an interview differently and 
therefore between-statement consistency may be less effective for discriminating between liars 
and truth-tellers. In three experiments, I examined conditions under which lying might affect 
memory with respect to accuracy, as well as how an interviewer’s questioning tactic might affect 
between-statement consistency. The two primary aims of this dissertation were to assess: (i) the 
effect of intentional deception on memory for the truth, and (ii) the extent to which between-
statement (in)consistency is related to deception. I assessed people’s metacognitive abilities 
when lying and telling the truth (Experiments 1 and 2), the effect of intentional deception on 
memory (Experiment 2), as well as how evidence-based interviewing techniques might lead to 
the production of inconsistencies (Experiment 3). Across all three experiments, I examined 
accurate memory for the encoded material (performed actions in Experiments 1 and 2; key facts 
acquired during a scavenger hunt in Experiment 3) as well as differences in the consistency of 
statements that were provided one week apart. 
Memory for Truthful and Deceptive Events 
Memory accuracy was greater for truthfully rehearsed information compared with 
information that was deceptively rehearsed or information that was not rehearsed. Specifically, 
source memory accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2 was significantly greater for truthfully 
rehearsed actions, especially when those actions were truthfully described. Additionally, people 
recalled more correct details learned during the scavenger hunt in Experiment 3 for areas of 
campus that had been previously rehearsed truthfully. With respect to consistency, people 
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initially interviewed with a Reverse Order instruction were more consistent when truthfully and 
falsely describing their activities during a scavenger hunt, compared to people who were initially 
interviewed with a Structured Interview.  
Evidence-based interviewing techniques were only assessed in Experiment 3. People 
provided more inconsistencies between initial and delayed recall when they were first 
interviewed with a Structured Interview. The Structured Interview in this experiment invited 
people to provide more information regarding three details within the free narrative using a “tell 
me more” prompt. Though accuracy for the details added following a “tell me more” prompt 
could not be assessed (though other work suggests they may be less accurate than unprompted 
details; Kontogianni et al., 2020), it is likely that these additional details were more peripheral to 
the primary tasks. For instance, some of these details reflected other people that they saw (but 
presumably did not interact with; e.g., “there was a guy with big black glasses” and “I almost ran 
into a girl”), while others reflected their personal thought processes or observations during the 
task (e.g., “it was loud in there [Mackay Hall]” and “I was too lazy to scan [a QR code on a flyer 
in Beardshear Hall] with my phone”). A more fine-grained analysis of the types of details 
provided and their centrality to the event would further elucidate this point. 
Metamemory and false memory were assessed in Experiments 1 and 2 only. A prior 
study by Besken (2018) demonstrated a metacognitive illusion associated with lying wherein 
people predicted they would remember truthful responses better but in actuality recalled more lie 
responses. This finding occurred when participants provided lies and truths about semantic 
information, providing either incorrect responses (lies) or correct responses (truths) to general 
knowledge questions. I did not find that people showed a metacognitive illusion for lying in this 
dissertation. Here, when lies and truths were provided about episodic information – actions that 
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people had or had not performed – people predicted they would remember truthfully rehearsed 
actions better than deceptively rehearsed actions (in line with Besken’s “prediction” aspect of the 
metacognitive illusion). The “performance” piece of the metacognitive illusion, however, was 
not replicated. In Experiments 1 and 2, truthfully rehearsed actions were associated with greater 
accuracy on the source memory test, especially when the actions had been truthfully described 
(rather than denied). Truthful descriptions were also more consistent than were false 
descriptions. However, false descriptions should have been better remembered (and arguably 
more consistent) if I were to observe this aspect of the metacognitive illusion.  
Overall, people appeared to overestimate their ability to remember denials on a future 
memory test. This disparity between prediction and performance for denials is likely to have 
implications for guilty suspects who choose to deny information during an interview. That is, 
guilty suspects may do so because they believe they will remember what information they 
denied. If they fail to remember that they denied information on a subsequent interview attempt, 
such inconsistencies are likely to be scrutinized more heavily by investigators. 
Compared to actions that were not performed and not rehearsed, lying about an action by 
creating a false description increased false recognition of having performed that action on a final 
memory test. This false recognition effect was exacerbated for participants who provided JOLs 
during the Rehearsal Phase, which may be due to the provision of JOLs changing how 
participants approached the rehearsal task (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2005). Researchers in the 
education domain have shown that participants who make JOLs may alter their learning 
strategies to be more effective (Sahakyan, Delany, & Kelley, 2004). Additionally, people may 
attempt to retrieve information when they make a JOL, and such a retrieval attempt may improve 
subsequent memory (Spellman & Bjork, 1992). Though I cannot assess whether a strategy 
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change occurred in the current data set, it is plausible that participants who made JOLs 
spontaneously retrieved their lie or truthful response when considering their future memory 
performance. 
A common thread across all experiments is a within-subjects condition reflecting 
something that was performed (simple actions in Experiments 1 and 2, or a series of activities in 
two campus buildings in Experiment 3) yet not rehearsed. This condition may be akin to what 
occurs in the real world, as when a guilty suspect does not provide a statement about what they 
actually did and instead creates a false narrative. The items that were performed but not 
rehearsed in Experiments 1 and 2 were counterbalanced and were not subject to participant 
selection. That is, participants did not actively choose to not rehearse an item – the only choice 
made was whether to lie or tell the truth for a specific action statement. However, in Experiment 
3, participants were able to choose which area of campus they would not discuss and which they 
would truthfully describe. Of the two areas of campus that were actually visited during encoding, 
participants chose one area to tell the truth about and, in lieu of rehearsing the second area that 
was visited, they instead provided a false description of an area that they did not visit.  
Across all three experiments, memory performance benefited with prior rehearsal. 
However, the extent of that benefit was dependent upon how the information was rehearsed. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, for instance, actions that were described were associated with higher 
source accuracy relative to performed-no rehearsal actions, but this was not true for actions that 
were denied. This may be similar to the denial-induced forgetting effect observed by Otgaar and 
his colleagues (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2016), wherein the act of denial impairs memory for having 
discussed a piece of information during an interview, but not necessarily for having witnessed it. 
True denials, in particular, may further reflect an extension of a phenomenon known as 
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“negation-induced forgetting,” which is characterized by a failure to recognize a studied item as 
having been seen before if a feature of the item was previously associated with a negation 
(Dianiska, Meissner, & Chan, in preparation; Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014). Upon examining 
the accuracy and the amount of detail associated with experiences that participants had 
previously not rehearsed (and instead had provided a false description of another event; see 
Experiment 3), it is clear that prior rehearsal is beneficial to memory. 
Volitional Deception and Memory 
Research on the relationship between lying and memory has been dominated by 
paradigms that involve experimenter-instructed lies and truths. Though some neuroimaging data 
suggests that volitional deception involves greater activation compared to instructed deception 
(Lisofsky et al., 2014), few prior studies have attempted to assess whether volition might 
influence memory for lies and truths. Those studies that have manipulated volition allowed for 
self-selection to a lying condition, yet observed no differences (if the instructed and intentional 
groups were analyzed separately) when volition was considered. The present Experiment 2, 
however, only manipulated volition with respect to which items were lied about, not with respect 
to whether lying occurred at all. As a result, I was able to circumvent a methodological issue that 
might lead too few people to choose to lie (as was the case in Romeo et al., 2018). Despite this, 
no differences were found between individuals who exercised volition and those who were 
yoked to choosers and instructed when to lie and tell the truth.  
It is possible that in the context of generating a lie or truth, the role of volition does not 
matter as much. In Experiment 2, generation of a lie was controlled while participant choice in 
when to generate was manipulated. Some participants were able to exert volition over the items 
that they would deny or describe (either truthfully or falsely). Participants in the yoked instructed 
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condition were prompted on which items to deny or describe, but these yoked participants still 
generated responses to the action statements. Future research could assess volition by also 
manipulating whether the participant self-generates a response, or is given a response to read and 
repeat by the experimenter. The current dissertation suggests that volition does not influence 
memory or metamemory performance. Though volition may be an important characteristic of 
lying in everyday life, its effects on memory may be too small to be of interest. 
Consistency Across Repeated Statements   
The content of people’s statements, both initially elicited and elicited from subsequent 
interview opportunities, may serve to discriminate lies from truths. In the three experiments 
presented here, truthfully provided statements about prior experiences were more detailed than 
experiences that were lied about. This was the case for statements obtained during both initial 
interviews (the video-recorded statements in the Rehearsal Phase in Experiments 1 and 2; Phase I 
interview in Experiment 3) and delayed interviews (the statements typed out during the 
descriptions test in Experiments 1 and 2; Phase II interview in Experiment 3). Therefore, the 
level of detail provided about an event could serve as an indicator of truthfulness (e.g., Evans et 
al., 2013).  
The nature of these details, such as whether they are consistent across time points, may 
also be important for the discrimination of lies and truths. Consistency and inconsistency across 
repeated interviews were considered with respect to four main types of information: repeated, 
omitted, reminiscent, and contradictory. Opportunities for repeated recall offer truth-tellers an 
occasion to appear inconsistent, should they provide new information in a subsequent statement. 
The addition of information that is reminiscent (and therefore inconsistent) may be more likely 
when people are cued to provide a second statement with a different cue than was used to elicit a 
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prior statement (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). Liars, on the other hand, may be perceived as 
suspicious should their statements be inconsistent across interviews and therefore may 
strategically attempt to maintain their narratives over time. Across all three experiments, 
truthfully described actions or activities were associated with a greater proportion of consistent 
details than were experiences that people lied about.  
The diagnosticity of between-statement consistency may be dubious, however, given the 
lack of agreement regarding how best to assess “consistency.” As shown in Experiment 3, the 
pattern of results differed based on whether two types of information were considered when 
calculating a consistency metric (repeated and contradictory details, see Leins et al., 2012) or 
whether the total number of details provided during an initial statement was considered. When 
consistency was computed with respect to only repeated and contradictory details, there was a 
main effect of veracity; however, using the proportion of total details that were consistent 
differed across interviews led to an effect of interview technique, not veracity. Given that 
laypeople and professionals tend to associate truthfulness with consistency, a consensus is 
needed on how best to ascertain a consistency metric for practitioners. 
Though it may be possible for truth-tellers to be inconsistent as a result of their ability to 
rely on their memory for an event, the findings in Experiment 3 suggest that the type of memory 
cuing afforded by a subsequent recall opportunity may be important for this to occur. Contrary to 
what I expected, people did not provide more reminiscent details during the Phase II interview 
when truthfully describing their activities. However, this was likely due to the Phase II interview 
not encouraging varied retrieval – rather, the recall prompt was free recall in nature. As a result, 
any reminiscence would have been spontaneous, as interviewers did not engage any memory-
enhancing or statement-enhancing techniques. Future work could examine the replicability of the 
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tendency for truth-tellers to provide more details on a subsequent interview when the type of 
technique used during Phase II is manipulated to be varied. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The current set of experiments provides information on when lying affects memory for 
the truth. However, these experiments cannot definitively answer why lying affects memory. 
One potential explanation is rooted in the source monitoring framework. False descriptions 
require constructive processes to generate details, and people may leverage memory for these 
constructive processes to determine whether an action was performed or not. Poor memory for 
false denials, on the other hand, could be explained by a relative lack of constructive processes 
able to be used in making a source judgment (compared to false descriptions). Alternatively, 
poor memory for false denials could be a result of a lack of rehearsal, or an implicit “instruction” 
to forget (akin to a not-directed directed forgetting effect).  
 Findings from Experiment 1 and 2 support a source-monitoring account of why lying 
affects memory (Johnson et al., 1993). Here, people were better able to remember whether an 
action was performed and how it was rehearsed when they were required to produce more 
effortful responses (descriptions) during the Rehearsal Phase. Presumably, these effortful 
constructive processes made the cognitive operations involved in generating the descriptions 
more memorable. With respect to false memory, one study (Dianiska, Lane, et al., in preparation) 
found that false descriptions increased recollection-based false memories whereas true denials 
increased familiarity-based false memories. It may be the case that participants who made JOLs 
during the Rehearsal Phase in Experiment 2 spontaneously retrieved their lie and truth responses, 
and such retrieval could increase source confusion and facilitate the formation of recollection-
based false memories. 
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Though effortful production of a description led to greater memory performance, some 
evidence suggests such effortful tasks may lead people to underestimate their future ability to 
remember having provided a description. This is in line with a fluency account (Oppenheimer, 
20080), with respect to how metacognitive accuracy may depend on the how a lie was generated. 
Creating a detailed true or false description is a relatively less fluent process when compared to 
providing a brief denial. However, this relative disfluency may be moderated by veracity. 
Truthfully described actions rely on a person’s memory for the event, and therefore may be 
easier to retrieve and describe than when a person creates a false description.  
Denials in this experiment were either explicit (Experiments 1 and 2) or implied 
(Experiment 3). The provision of explicit denials, and the subsequent poorer memory for both 
true and false denials on the final memory test, could be understood in terms of several 
underlying mechanisms. As noted previously, true denials may serve as an extension of a 
negation-induced forgetting effect. Negation-induced forgetting is a phenomenon wherein after 
studying an image of an object (e.g., a blue ball), people may fail to recognize an object as 
having been seen before if the object was associated with a correct “negation” on a test about 
features of encoded objects (e.g., correctly saying “no” to the feature test statement, “The ball 
was red”; Mayo et al, 2014). Though some evidence suggests that this may be due to interference 
created by the feature test statement (Dianiska, Meissner, & Chan, in preparation), the current 
data are unable to speak to such an interference mechanism when people lie versus tell the truth.  
The mnemonic effect of implicit denials may be due to a relative lack of rehearsal, as 
suggested by the MAD framework (Otgaar & Baker, 2018). When participants in Experiment 3 
provided false descriptions about an unvisited area of campus, they did so at the expense of not 
rehearsing an area of campus that was visited during the scavenger hunt. As a result, people 
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provided less information about the unrehearsed area of campus when they were later asked to 
truthfully recall their experience. The fact that the unrehearsed experience was associated with 
less detail could also be due to a spontaneous inhibition strategy that people may use to facilitate 
their lie-telling. That is, relative to areas that were truthfully rehearsed, in order to effectively 
produce a false description of an unexperienced event, people may have attempted to 
intentionally inhibit information about their activities in the unrehearsed area of campus. Future 
research could assess these cognitive mechanisms. 
Applied Implications 
Interviewing techniques that are considered best practice are designed to increase the 
volume of information obtained from an interview. Memory-enhancing interviewing techniques, 
such as the Cognitive Interview, can increase the amount of information obtained from 
cooperative eyewitness as well as provide more verbal content cues that can be used to 
discriminate between liars and truth-tellers. In Experiment 3, for instance, content cues such as 
the length of participants’ statements and the consistency of details within those statements were 
reliably more associated with truthfully described experiences than falsely described 
experiences. However, in order to be compliant with an interviewer’s request, a person may 
provide information that they are less confident in (and may thus be inaccurate) or provide 
information that they know to be false in order to appear cooperative. The current experiments 
show that knowingly providing false information has the potential to impair memory for the 
truth.  
Both of the interviewing techniques used to elicit narratives in Experiment 3 are 
considered “best practice”. The current research did not assess the effect of these best practice 
techniques in comparison to customary accusatorial tactics, such as those trained in the Reid 
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technique (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013; see Meissner, Kelly, & Woestehoff, 2015). 
Tactics that are characteristic of the Reid technique include shutting down denials and 
confronting the suspect with evidence of their guilt. In future work, it may be useful to contrast 
the effects of lying on memory when best practice interview techniques are compared to such 
guilt-presumptive techniques.  
Despite the benefit to some interrogation outcomes when “best practice” interview 
techniques are used (e.g., the diagnosticity of a confession; see Meissner, Redlich, Bhatt, & 
Brandon, 2012 for a review), such techniques allow a subject to “tell their story” in a way that 
permits both denials as well as deceptive narratives. In a similar manner, approaches like the 
Cognitive Interview can lead to small increases in incorrect details being provided by the subject 
– though such interviews also lead to large increases in correct details, thereby mitigating the 
effect on a person’s overall accuracy (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). Could such provision 
of deceptive or incorrect information harm subsequent recall? The current data suggest that 
people who have previously lied are at a disadvantage (mnemonically speaking) should they 
decide at a later point to be truthful and forthcoming with an interviewer. In Experiment 3, 
participants provided significantly less detail about an area that had previously been lied about 
(compared to the first time that they provided a truthful account of their activities in a different 
area) and were less accurate when asked to recall the correct answers to the key details they had 
been tasked to remember during the scavenger hunt.  
An open question remains: how could we aid individuals who later decide to tell the 
truth? With respect to the Mueller investigation mentioned previously, once Manafort withdrew 
his plea could interviewers use strategic interviewing techniques to increase the quality of his 
subsequent statements? Some evidence from the forced fabrication literature suggests that an 
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interview with a statement-enhancing technique (such as a modified Cognitive Interview) that 
occurs after a person forcibly fabricates information can increase the amount of correct 
information recalled about an event (Memon, Zaragoza, Clifford, & Kidd, 2010). However, this 
effect on correct information was overshadowed by the persistence of suggestibility, relative to 
those interviewed with a control (free recall) interview. While further research is warranted, it 
appears that the use of memory-enhancing techniques may not entirely ameliorate the 
detrimental effects of lying on memory. 
Based on the current data, both follow-up questioning (as in the Structured Interview) and 
asking participants to recall an event in reverse chronological order appear to be beneficial 
techniques. However, though the Reverse Order instruction encouraged fewer overall details 
during the initial recall attempt, the use of this technique had the benefit of promoting fewer 
inconsistencies for truth-tellers relative to the Structured Interview. Further, it seems as though 
the Reverse Order instruction may serve to improve memory accuracy for key details associated 
with the unrehearsed experience (d = 0.46, relative to the Structured Interview condition). 
Though more information was provided during Phase I with the Structured Interview, these 
participants also showed more omissions and reminiscences during Phase II.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Future work should further elucidate the mechanisms by which lying affects accurate and 
false memory. As noted above, an effect of volition may become apparent when compared to an 
instructed condition that lacks a generation component. Furthermore, though people did not tend 
to show a correlation between predictions of future performance and actual performance, it may 
be instructive to assess retrospective confidence. In future research, post-source judgment 
confidence ratings and memory basis judgments could be included (as in Dianiska, Lane, et al., 
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in prep) to further examine false memory for participants who provided JOLs during the 
Rehearsal Phase, as well as to explore whether (potentially) volitional liars might be better 
calibrated with respect to the relationship between confidence and accuracy. Finally, participants 
who chose items to lie or tell the truth about in Experiment 2 did so “in the moment” when they 
saw the action statement appear on the screen. However, in real-world settings, a guilty suspect 
may expect to be questioned and therein prepare a cover story in advance. Future work could 
manipulate not only volition but also the ability to plan the lie. For instance, instead of having 
participants make online judgments about whether they would lie or tell the truth, participants 
could select the items prior to beginning the Rehearsal Phase. 
While Experiment 3 offers a more ecologically valid paradigm, it does so at the expense 
of being able to assess participant’s statement accuracy. Given the variability in participants’ 
episodic experiences during the scavenger hunt (e.g., encountering different people and obstacles 
along the way), accuracy could only be assessed for the information that was required to be 
learned during the scavenger hunt. Future iterations of this paradigm might involve the inclusion 
of a confederate in the experimental task that would allow for a more natural, yet verifiable, 
encoding task. Additionally, in the current experiment only memory accuracy following an 
(implicit) false denial could be assessed. The current paradigm does not assess whether people 
may develop false memories of having visited the area of campus that they describe in their false 
narrative. Future research could examine whether participants come to believe that they visited 
those areas of campus as well. 
Additionally, two comparison conditions were absent from Experiment 3 that would be 
useful to examine in future research. First, a Phase I “free recall” interview condition that does 
not involve a memory or statement-enhancing technique would be useful for discerning whether 
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a Structured Interview is (statistically) equivalent to the Reverse Order condition with respect to 
both total detail and consistency. Second, a Phase I “free recall” interview condition that is then 
immediately is asked to recall both areas of campus that were visited truthfully (akin to the 
current Phase I interview) would allow for a cleaner assessment of whether and how lying affects 
memory in this paradigm.  
Finally, of interest to the current dissertation was whether truth-tellers, who may be more 
likely to be inconsistent when interviewed with either a reverse-order recall instruction or a 
structured interview, may be misattributed as liars when such inconsistencies arise. Though 
truth-tellers tended to be more consistent in this study, future research should examine whether 
people can accurately discern whether participants in the current experiment lied and told the 
truth. 
Conclusions 
In three experiments, I examined the effects of lying on memory when ecological validity 
is considered through both manipulations (in Experiments 1 and 2) and paradigm (Experiment 
3). Though intentionality is considered to be characteristic of deception in everyday life, 
allowing participants to choose when to lie and tell the truth failed to moderate the relationship 
between lying and memory. Furthermore, lying about one’s experiences led to both less accurate 
memory for those experiences and less consistent statements. The current data suggest that the 
act of lying, regardless of whether it is instructed or volitional, has a detrimental effect on 
memory for what truthfully occurred. 
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